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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
In recent years, some concern has been expressed by 
Department of Defense officials about the rate at which minority 
active duty officers are promoted as compared with their non- 
minority counterparts (Robinson and Prevette, 1992).  This 
concern has extended to the current military downsizing, during 
which numerous policies have been implemented to assist 
policymakers in achieving endstrength goals and in restructuring 
the force. 
DOD policies have historically supported specific objectives 
with regard to minorities in all phases of the manpower system, 
including accession, retention, and promotion.  Drawdown 
policies, however, have been designed primarily to meet 
endstrength goals, without regard to any potential effects on 
specific groups.  Similarly, the military downsizing has 
eliminated many billets and facilities, which may have affected 
the opportunities for some officer groups more or less than 
others. 
Hence, it is appropriate to determine what unintended 
effects the drawdown, and the policies that have been implemented 
to achieve the drawdown, may have had on the position of minority 
officers.  After all, "civil rights leaders worry that minorities 
will suffer disproportionately from the Defense Department's 
ongoing manpower squeeze" (Kitfield, 1994, p.28).  Even at the 
dawn of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), there were critics who 
feared that the military would become increasingly 
unrepresentative of the society it was established to protect and 
defend (Binkin and Eitelberg, 1986, p.74). 
B.   OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
The study attempts to identify potential problem areas in 
which downsizing policies may have affected the status of 
minority officers.  It also attempts to identify potential 
solutions to such problems.  The benefit to DOD is that the 
solution of such problems may improve the overall utilization of 
the officer corps, and, ultimately, military readiness. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the effects of 
the drawdown on the promotion of minority officers.  The research 
seeks to determine whether differences exist in the promotion 
experiences of minority and non-minority officers; if such 
differences exist, which specific policies or determinants can be 
identified as causal influences; and, if differences exist, 
whether they have improved or deteriorated during the period of 
the military drawdown. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The literature concerning the employment of racial and 
ethnic minorities, the drawdown and promotion rates, and 
determinants of promotion is examined.  This places the ensuing 
analysis in context and assists in specifying the multivariate 
promotion models.  The scope of the thesis is also determined, in 
part, by the data set.  Promotion rate data are available from 
1977 through to 1994. 
Although women are commonly referred to as a "minority" in 
the military (despite the fact that they are a majority of the 
general population), they are not considered as part of the 
minority group in this study, though they are recognised 
separately.  This is because the experiences of, and problems 
facing, women are not the same as those of ethnic or racial 
minorities.  Therefore, any further reference to a "minority" is 
made with respect to racial/ethnic minority groups (male or 
female).  Furthermore, only three racial/ethnic minority groups 
are considered: blacks, Hispanics, and others.  This third 
group, called "others", simplifies the analysis by amalgamating a 
diverse range of racial/ethnic groups that constitute a 
relatively small proportion of the population. 
It is also assumed that the reader is already familiar with 
the history of minority involvement in the US military 
(specifically, prior to the creation of the AVF).  Consequently, 
a detailed commentary is not undertaken in this study.  Nixon 
(1993), Northrup et al. (1979), and Binkin and Eitelberg (1982) 
give thorough analyses of this historical involvement. 
E. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
The literature review focuses on journal articles, technical 
reports, and books on the drawdown, promotion, and minority 
issues.  It describes how organizations have sought to manage 
reductions-in-force while trying to promote diversity throughout 
the workplace.  More specifically, the review emphasizes material 
concerning the determinants of minority promotion, as a basis for 
an a priori  evaluation of the effect of the drawdown on the 
promotion of minority officers. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This study is organized into seven chapters.  Following 
these introductory remarks is a chapter ("Background") that 
discusses minority representation, the evolution of attitudes 
towards minorities in the US, the military's approach to 
combating racial and representation problems, and the experience 
of previous military drawdowns.  Chapter III ("Literature 
Review"), surveys a range of articles and reports that are 
relevant to this study.  Chapter IV ("Ethnic Representation and 
Occupational Trends") provides an analysis of the data files and 
some descriptive statistics concerning ethnic representation in 
the military.  Chapter V ("Methodology in Promotion Analysis"), 
describes the restrictions and assumptions that have been placed 
upon the cohort data file in this study, the effects of these 
processes on the suitability of the data file for this study, and 
the variables that are used in the promotion models.  Chapter V 
also discusses the data analysis and statistical procedures that 
are employed.  Chapter VI ("Analysis of Promotion Outcomes"), 
reports the findings and interprets the results of the analysis. 
Chapter VII contains the conclusions and recommendations. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.   WHY IS MINORITY REPRESENTATION AN ISSUE? 
1. Evidence of Discrimination 
"Ethnic minorities and women in the United States have 
suffered social and economic discrimination for centuries," 
observe Kravitz and Platania (1993, p.928).  This has resulted in 
a tremendous disparity between the proportion of minorities in 
the general population and the proportion of highly-paid 
professional employees who are members of minority groups. 
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1993, p.22), the major racial or ethnic 
groups and their respective percentage of the population in 1991 
were: white (75.2 percent), black (11.9 percent), Hispanic (9.3 
percent) and other (3.7 percent).  Yet, as Zweigenhaft reported 
in 1987, just 32 of the top 100 major corporations in the US had 
at least one black on their board; and none of these had become a 
chief executive officer (Zweigenhaft, 1987, p.38). 
2. Discrimination Remedies 
Attempts have been made in recent years to decrease 
discrimination based on demographic status and to mitigate the 
effects of past discrimination.  A range of Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO) and Affirmative Action (AA) programs have been 
conceived to this end.  Representation goals have, therefore, 
been justified to eventually restore equity to the labor market 
and, in the more immediate timeframe, to provide a reference 
point for measuring the success of EEO and AA initiatives.  The 
importance of representation has intensified over the years as 
the "shift toward minorities since 1980 is the sharpest of the 
20th century" (Barringer, 1991, p.l). 
3. Inherent Policy Contradictions 
As some writers have observed, the principles of equal 
opportunity and equal representation are often at odds with each 
other.  For example, Brehm is cited by Binkin and Eitelberg 
(1986, p.88) as asking: "Does America prefer its army to 
represent a reasonable cross section of the American racial and 
social fabric, or will it be content to accept major departures 
from a representative force as a consequence of applying the 
principle of equal opportunity to a PMVF [Peacetime Military 
Volunteer Force] recruited largely through economic incentives?" 
In other words, there can be an inherent contradiction between 
letting the market forces govern recruiting outcomes and, 
similarly, identifying specific representation targets for those 
outcomes.  This is one of the key dilemmas of the volunteer 
force. 
B.   IS POPULATION REPRESENTATION AN APPROPRIATE GOAL? 
1.   Determining the Population Against Which Representation 
Should be Assessed 
The US Navy has established the goal of achieving 
population representation for minorities within its officer ranks 
by the year 2001.  However, Sowell points out that there are 
differences in the average ages of ethnic groups and that to 
"compare any group's representation in adult jobs with their 
representation in a population that includes five-year-olds is to 
compare apples and oranges" (Sowell, 1982, pp.37-38).  The 
debates concerning representation often proceed without 
considering whether or not the pool of people from which the 
military can draw actually represents the general population 
(Gorman and Thomas, 1993, p.611).  Therefore, demographic 
representation is more relevant. 
It is generally a prerequisite for an officer to be a 
college graduate.  Similarly, most officers do not serve much 
beyond 20 years.  Therefore, it can be assumed that most officers 
fall within the range of 22 to 42 years old.  The closest age 
range that can be used from available census data is for 20 to 44 
year olds.  A comparison of the ethnic representation of the 
total population and this specified range for 1991 is shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1.  Representation by Racial/Ethnic Group and Age Group, 
1991 
Racial/Ethnic            Percentage Representation 
Group       —  
20 - 44 Year Olds   Total Population 
White 73.1 75.2 
Black 12.3 11.9 
Hispanic 10.5 9.3 
Other 4.1 3.7 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993, p.22. 
As seen in Table 1, Sowell's concerns are generally 
unfounded with respect to the military.  This is because all of 
the ethnic minority groups have a higher concentration of their 
numbers in the age bracket that is most closely associated with 
military service.  It could be argued that the goal of 
population representation in the military does not go far enough. 
However, it represents a worthwhile goal which, if fulfilled, 
would go a long way toward redressing the current ethnic or 
racial imbalances in representation. 
2.   Is There a Trade-off Between "Representation" and 
"Readiness"? 
The primary function of any military establishment is 
to defend the nation and its interests.  Moskos argues that "the 
ideas of citizenship obligation or social representativeness are 
incidental concerns in manning a military force.  Such a mindset 
has contributed to moving the American military toward an 
occupational format" (Moskos, 1986, pp.15-16).  After all, the 
establishment of the new representation goals invokes an 
intuitively strong theoretical relationship.  If accession 
standards have to be lowered, pursuing these goals may be met at 
the expense of military effectiveness; conversely, effectiveness 
may be maintained at the expense of equity and representation 
considerations.  Therefore, the question of "whether the racial 
makeup of the armed forces has any bearing on their capacity to 
fulfill that mission must be examined" (Binkin and Eitelberg, 
1982, p.84). 
There has been much discussion in recent years 
concerning the link between "quality" and the performance of 
military personnel.  However, the extent of any trade-off between 
minority representation and readiness has seldomly been 
addressed.  Binkin and Eitelberg assessed the effectiveness of 
military forces in terms of three factors: the capabilities of 
the individuals, group performance, and the image they project to 
other countries.  They concluded that a "healthy measure of 
uncertainty remains about how the racial composition of the armed 
services affects all three" (Binkin and Eitelberg, 1982, p.119). 
Some studies have attempted to link mental ability and 
on-the-job performance.1 The vast majority of studies, however, 
focus on the enlisted ranks and not on officers.  Although a 
clear link has been established between Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) categories, high school diploma status, 
and attrition, the link between these factors and actual job 
performance is much more dubious.  In psychology, the "goodness" 
of a predictor of job performance is assessed against two 
criteria: reliability and validity.  Reliability refers to 
"consistency and stability of measure; validity refers to 
accuracy and precision" (Muchinsky,  1993, p.93).  If either of 
these criteria are not satisfied, then the relationship between 
the predictor and job performance becomes less clear. 
In fact, most researchers believe that AFQT and high 
school diploma status are indicators not of "quality", but of 
1
 For example, see "Are smart tankers better? AFQT and 
military productivity" by Scribner et al. (1986), in which a 
positive relationship between the two is identified. 
persistence, or the ability to see an activity through to its 
completion.  Although it is pleasing to one's intuition, there is 
simply very little empirical evidence that a person with a higher 
score on a college admissions test (such as the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test or SAT) will make a better officer.  There are many 
things that contribute to an officer's success that may not be 
measured by such tests, with leadership and communication skills 
as good examples.  Many even charge that such standardized tests 
are biased against minorities.  Because of the consistent 
differences in average group performance on many standardized 
tests, there has been a persistent concern that ability tests may 
be biased against minority group members (Hartigan and Wigdor, 
1989, pp.5-6).  The fact that a test is a "paper and pencil" 
instrument, or uses the English language, can in itself be a 
source of bias against minority applicants within a multi- 
cultural society (Crocker and Algina, 1986, p.376-393). 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded definitively that there is any 
significant trade-off between representation and military 
readiness. 
3.  Anti-discrimination Programs 
A number of anti-discrimination programs have been 
introduced into the labor market in recent years.  Most of these 
can be categorized as either EEO or AA programs.  Although these 
terms are often used synonymously or in conjunction with each 
other, they are fundamentally different in their methods and 
aims.  Under an EEO program, a person is judged as an individual 
according to his or her merits; whereas, under an AA program, a 
person is also judged as a member of a group and may receive 
differential treatment according to the status of that group. 
Kravitz and Platania (1993) argue that although whites 
"support equal opportunity, they generally oppose affirmative 
action.  Specifically, they oppose quota hiring and preferential 
treatment for under-represented groups" (Kravitz and Platania, 
1993, p.928). Affirmative action measures are often used to 
temporarily accelerate the accession and promotion of minorities 
(at above average rates) so that the minority representation is 
equal to or greater than the average.  However, this will ensure 
that the majority is recruited and promoted at below-average 
rates over that transitional period (Robinson and Prevette, 1992, 
p.17).  After all, nothing abuses a person's sense of natural 
justice more than the unequal treatment of equals (Block and 
Walker, 1982, p.5).  Denying people the opportunity to join the 
military simply because quotas have to be met forces them to 
adopt a different or less desirable employment option.  It can be 
argued that these "people designated 'overrepresented' end up 
paying the full cost of achieving someone else's version of 
social justice" (Gorman and Thomas, 1993, p.612). 
The important point is to not lose sight of the theory 
behind the principle of AA. Given two equally qualified people, 
AA measures seek to give preference to the minority applicant. 
The "action" is expected to affirmatively counteract the effects 
of institutional discrimination, which, by definition, cannot be 
easily eliminated. AA is frequently misunderstood and poorly 
implemented—mostly because two human beings are never equal. 
By these standards, therefore, any mechanisms that the 
military uses to raise ethnic representation are likely to be 
perceived as affirmative action measures, as they seek to attract 
and retain personnel from particular ethnic groups.  In fact, 
Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) support research that systematically 
attempts to assess the impact of racist motives on support for 
government programs to assist minorities.  They "strongly object, 
however, to treating opposition to such policies as racist by 
definition"   (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986, p.182).  It is 
necessary to try and put racial views aside and deal with the 
policy issues in as objective a manner as possible. 
C.   MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY 
1.  The Effect of the AVF on Minorities 
The AVF era has actually seen blacks become 
overrepresented in the military's enlisted force.  Smaller 
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increases have been associated with minority representation in 
the officer ranks.  Consequently, the effect of military service 
on minority groups has become a significant issue.  A primary 
concern is that military service risks the lives of many of the 
most talented and promising future minority leaders.  However, 
there is widespread recognition of the benefits that military 
service can bestow upon its members—aside from the obvious 
benefits of employment and income. 
First, the military serves as a valuable training 
ground, giving minorities opportunities for education and skills 
training that they might otherwise not receive.  In fact, 
Janowitz and Moskos (1994) argue from the perspective of civil- 
military relations that there should be clearer recognition of 
the secondary functions of the military with respect to education 
and skills training as there remains a great deal of uncertainty 
and ambiguity about this task among professional officers 
(Janowitz and Moskos, 1974, p.119). 
Second, Young (1982) relates how minority-military 
service, particularly during times of war, can adopt a "quid pro 
quo" theme, namely, "full support of the war effort on the part 
of the minority and its leadership in return for full citizenship 
rights or other benefits for minority-group members" (Young, 
1982, p.255).  Even in peacetime, military service can help 
assimilate minorities into society.  Young cites Shils as saying 
that the military "can serve to integrate diverse ethnic groups 
into a national community; it can teach skills useful in economic 
development...and give them a greater concern for the nation as a 
whole" (Young, 1982, p.25). 
2.   Military Manpower Considerations 
A number of factors associated with minority 
participation in the military need to be considered when policy 
makers seek to increase this participation.  For example, many of 
the minorities of Hispanic and Asian origin are first- or second- 
generation immigrants from countries in which the military may 
not be viewed as a desirable career option.  In some cases (such 
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as Cuba and Chile), these immigrants have fled from oppressive 
military rule.  It could therefore be much harder to meet the 
representation goals for these ethnic groups. 
Another factor that could make this goal difficult to 
achieve is the ability of minority candidates to meet the 
military's guality reguirements.  For example, Binkin and 
Eitelberg (1986) report that the military is becoming 
increasingly technological and therefore reguires rising levels 
of education and ability from its new personnel.  However, the 
"margin of difference in the average educational level of whites 
and blacks nationwide and the test score differences revealed in 
the Profile of American Youth  imply that, unless the services 
modify their classification criteria, blacks (as well as 
Hispanics) may be disproportionately relegated to the military's 
'soft skills' for some time to come" (Binkin and Eitelberg, 1986, 
p.96).  Since these so-called "soft" jobs are diminishing, 
minorities may actually wind up being sgueezed out of the 
military, unless compensatory measures are introduced.  Changes 
in eligibility reguirements may therefore have to be considered 
if minority representation is going to be increased.  At the same 
time, attempts to achieve increased participation by minorities 
are affected by trends in the population of military-age youth, 
including both the declining supply of potential members and 
shifts in the relative size of racial/ethnic groups.  These 
trends are illustrated in Table 2. 
The age bracket of 15- to 24-year-olds covers the main 
recruiting population for military officers, as it encompasses 
recent college graduates, current college students, and short- 
term college entrants.  Table 2 confirms that, even in absolute 
terms, this youth population actually decreased by almost 5.5 
million between 1980 and 1990.  At a macro level, this is not a 
good trend for future recruiting—though the impact may be partly 
offset by the reduced reguirement for manpower in the "downsized" 
force. 
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Table 2.  Number and Percentage Distribution of Youth Population, 




(000) Percent (000) Percent 
White 32,740 77.0 25,969 70.1 
Black 5,633 13.3 5,133 13.9 
Hispanic 3,192 7.5 4,404 11.9 
Other 922 2.2 1,508 4.1 
Total 42,487 100.0 37,014 100.0 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993, p.22 
Furthermore, this population trend has more or less 
bottomed out in 1995.  Table 3 shows projected population 
distribution trends to the year 2010.  It can be seen that the 
proportion of youths in the population is projected to be stable 
for the remainder of the decade and slowly rise thereafter. 
Table 3 also shows that all of the minority groups should 
continue to increase their share of the youth population at the 
expense of whites.   Future diversity targets may actually become 
easier to satisfy. 
It is widely acknowledged that because of the intense 
competition women face for limited employment opportunities in 
the military, the women who succeed in gaining military 
commissions have higher average levels of education and SAT 
scores than do men.  To some degree, therefore, targeting 
minority women may overcome some of the problems of selecting 
qualified people and, similarly, further help the military meet 
its diversity goals (on both ethnic and gender grounds). 
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Table 3.  Projected Percentage Distribution of Youth Population, 
18-24 Years Old, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Racial/Ethnic 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Group 
White 67.9 66.5 65.2 62.9 
Black 14.2 14.3 14.1 14.7 
Hispanic 12.9 13.6 14.4 15.6 
Other 5.0        5.6        6.3        6.8 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993, p.25, 
18-24 Year Olds as 
Percent of Population    9.5       9.5       9.8      10.1 
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III.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. WHAT ARE THE RECURRENT ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE LITERATURE? 
Because this is such a current topic, the literature does 
not specifically address the issue of minority promotions during 
a military drawdown.  However, the participation of minorities in 
the military has been studied in some detail.  According to Young 
(1982), "the subject of minority groups and military service 
should be dealt with not only in terms of a study of such groups 
in military organizations; rather, it should also be examined in 
terms of the societal context within which the interaction 
between the group and the military organization operates" (Young, 
1982, p.20).  Conseguently, some major issues associated with 
this subject are identified and examined below. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF PROMOTION 
Promotions are extremely important to employees and 
organizations.  However, the extensive downsizing that has been 
associated with the corporate environment in recent years has 
reduced the opportunity for upward mobility.  This has presented 
a management crisis, about which very little research has been 
undertaken.  It is therefore appropriate to examine the 
importance and determinants of the promotion decision in some 
detail. 
1.   Promotions as a Motivation and Allocation Tool 
Organizations use promotions to motivate employees 
(Markham, Harlan and Hackett, 1987; Rosenbaum, 1984).  Promotions 
are a source of status, recognition, responsibility, higher pay, 
and opportunities for further advancement.  In fact, for 
virtually "as long as work organizations have been in existence, 
employees have defined their career success in terms of upward 
mobility" (Ferris et al., 1994, p.47).  A study that examined the 
relationship between promotion and morale/motivation among Air 
Force officers reinforced this view.  It found that non-selection 
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for promotion has a negative morale/motivational impact (Winters, 
1978). 
From the organization's viewpoint, "promotions are 
central to the efficient utilization of its human resources" 
(London and Stumpf, 1983, p.242).  In other words, promotions 
improve productivity by channeling employees into positions that 
best match their abilities and exert pressure on poor performers 
to either improve their performance or leave the organization 
(Baker et al., 1988, pp.61-62). This practice is evident in the 
military, where an "up or out" promotion policy is employed. 
Accordingly, a youthful force with well-rounded experience can be 
maintained. 
2.   Implications of Reduced Promotions 
As mentioned earlier, the reality is that promotions 
are becoming scarce.  "Flattening organizational hierarchies, 
recession, and slow economic recovery have resulted in fewer 
promotional opportunities for upwardly mobile employees" (Bonner 
and Medsker, 1993, p.9).  This has been exacerbated by baby-boom 
demographics.  According to Baker et al. (1988, p.62), reduced 
promotion opportunities can be linked to low levels of 
satisfaction, motivation and commitment, and increases in 
turnover, apathy, resistance to change, and cynicism.  Promotions 
appear to occupy a central role in the turnover process (Carson 
et al., 1994, p.456).  Managers, therefore, "are struggling to 
learn new ways to motivate and retain valued employees as 
promotions become less available" (Gelatt, 1992, p.33). 
This situation is complicated somewhat in organizations 
with an "up or out" promotion system, where non-promotees cannot 
be retained because failure to promote negates any other 
indicators of high performance (Bonner and Medsker, 1993, p.9). 
This is the case in the military, where the "up or out" policy 
was introduced in 1947 as part of the Officer Personnel Act.  It 
was justified on the grounds of providing a flow of officers 
through the rank structure to maintain an effective balance of 
youth, guality, and experience for peacetime that is capable of 
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meeting the demands of war (Jantz, 1986, p.2).  Jantz cites an 
opposing view to this policy from the 1976 Defense Manpower 
Commission Report, which argued that it is "inconceivable that a 
Service member who has been screened many times during his life 
by other promotion boards, by Service schools and other selection 
boards, and by other evaluations is suddenly of no further value 
to his Service simply because the Service does not have enough 
promotions to go around" (Jantz, 1986, p.2). 
This sort of promotion policy adds to the loss of 
confidence that the non-promotee feels.  Similarly, an "up or 
out" system and/or reduced promotions add to the importance of 
the promotion decisions and the scrutiny they receive in 
organizations.  This is evident from the fact that, in 1990, 
nearly 61 percent of the bias charges filed with the Egual 
Employment Opportunity Commission focused on employee promotion 
and discharge decisions (Ferris et al., 1992, p.66).  These 
decisions, therefore, need to be taken very seriously. 
3. Implications of Poor Promotion Decisions 
It follows, then, that in "addition to the legal 
scrutiny that promotion decisions are likely to receive, 
organizations should be quite concerned about the skill and 
performance consequences of faulty upward mobility decisions 
(Ferris et al., 1992, p.66).  It is the organisation that 
ultimately bears the serious effects of faulty promotion 
decisions through increased costs due to absenteeism, more 
grievances filed, and lower productivity (Freiberg, 1991, p.23). 
This is confirmed by a recent study into the effect of promotion 
decisions on employee's attitudes.  It was found that failure to 
get an expected promotion "was associated with feelings of 
inequity, a decrease in commitment and an increase in 
absenteeism" (Schwarzwald et al., 1992, p.511). 
4. Factors that can Affect Promotability 
a.   System of Promotion 
Halaby (1978) cites Weber (an early prominant 
theorist on promotion systems) as saying that there is "a system 
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of promotion according to seniority, or to achievement or both" 
(Halaby, 1978, p.466).  The less that promotions are oriented 
towards seniority, then the more judgmental they can become, 
"often based on ambiguous criteria and numerous sources of 
information, much of which is subjective" (Stumpf and London, 
1981, p.539).  Conversely, in seniority promotion systems, 
personnel are normally advanced to more senior positions because 
of their greater length of service—not because of superior 
skill, ability, or performance (Mills, 1985, p.421).  Although 
military promotions require that the individual reach a certain 
level of seniority before being considered for promotion, the 
actual promotion decision is based on a range of individual 
characteristics.  These are examined in the remainder of this 
section. 
b.   Individual Variables 
Some individual characteristics used to make 
promotion decisions "are ability related (e.g., performance and 
potential for advancement), whereas others are nonability related 
(e.g., sex and race)" (London and Stumpf, 1983, p.243).  Wise 
(1975) found in a promotion study that job performance and 
promotion, as measured by the rate of salary increase, were not 
only correlated with academic achievement "but the evidence 
suggested that mastery of academic subject matter contributed to 
an individual's ability to perform job-related tasks" (Wise, 
1975, p.913).  This suggests that academic training and job 
performance are inter-related and are, therefore, factors that 
can affect promotability. 
Another factor is age.  In fact, the importance of 
age on "promotability" has grown due to the recent elimination of 
compulsory retirement ages for most workers (Cox and Nkome, 1992, 
p.197).  It is quite reasonable to assume that performance in a 
job requiring physical responses such as dexterity, strength, 
speed, and movement accuracy could be age-influenced.  However, 
unequal rewards (be they pay and/or promotions) for older and 
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younger workers who are either measured or perceived to be 
essentially equal in performance ability would be discrimination. 
In a study of the careers of 1,628 managers and 
their immediate supervisors in three private-sector 
organizations, Siegel developed three groups of older and younger 
ages for comparative purposes.  This is because definitions of 
age groups are quite elusive and at best, very flexible (and 
changes in legislation are constantly creating confusion in age- 
related definitions).  The three older worker age groups (and 
their younger worker counterparts) were: 
Age Groups 
Older Workers Younger Workers 
45 - 63 23 - 44 
50 - 63 23 - 49 
55 - 63 23 - 54 
The study found that there was no significant 
difference between the evaluations for all groups of older 
managers compared with corresponding groups of younger managers. 
On the other hand, "the likelihood of promotion for these same 
older and younger groups of managers does show significant 
differences.  In all categories, the older managers are less 
likely to be promoted" (Siegel, 1993, p.43).  Another study found 
that when work performance was equal, older persons were judged 
to be less fit to continue their employment (Crew, 1984, p.431). 
Consequently, age discrimination can be a factor 
in promotion decisions.  This discrimination is likely to be less 
common in the military.  Age restrictions at the point of 
accession, combined with the "up or out" promotion policy, and 
the departure of a large proportion of personnel after 20 years 
of service tend to reduce the age distribution at any given 
promotion board.  It is determined later in this analysis whether 
this relative age compression serves to excerbate the importance 
of small deviations in age on promotion outcomes in the military. 
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It is interesting to note that two of the 
promotion characteristics that have been mentioned here (namely, 
age and education) are also discussed as prominant determinants 
of promotion in a 1956 article titled "How to identify promotable 
executives" (Rändle, 1956).  The author conducted an extensive 
survey of 1,427 executives and concluded that "It is apparent 
that both age and education play an important role in determining 
promotability or affecting promotion potential" (Rändle, 1956, 
p. 132).  These factors have therefore stood the test of time. 
Yet another factor in promotion decisions may be 
physical attractiveness.  In a study designed to test this 
hypothesis, it was found that physical attractiveness 
"significantly affected the extent to which personnel 
professionals would recommend a candidate for promotion. . . . 
These findings, however, explained a maximum of only 2% of the 
variance in ratings" (Morrow et al., 1990, p.733). 
This effect may be compounded in the military, 
because of the fact that promotion boards also view the member's 
photograph in their file while reviewing his or her performance 
history.  Even though "promotion-board members may not voice 
prejudices, such information allows them to discriminate, 
consciously or subconsciously, against minorities in arriving at 
their decisions" (Baldwin and Rothwell, 1993, p.17).  This 
potential for this effect was confirmed by the analysis of the 
outcomes from a mock promotion board (Madura, 1977).  Photographs 
were rotated between record folders with the rest of the 
information in the folder remaining constant.  The folders 
containing "positive charisma" photos consistently rated higher 
than those folders containing "negative charisma" photos for the 
same performance data.  Essentially, the same pictures were being 
promoted regardless of the record set accompanying the photo. 
Stewart and Firestone (1992, p.439) contend that promotion to the 
upper ranks may reflect underlying stereotypes about which 
individuals make better officers.  The military likes its 
personnel to have a "command presence" and enforces strict 
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guidelines regarding proper military appearance (such as clothes, 
hair, and demeanor). 
Therefore, demographic variables, such as race and 
gender, may have an effect on promotion outcomes.  Some studies 
suggest that "slower promotion rates still persist among 
minorities, although the findings are not consistent. . . .The 
facts suggest that one use caution in drawing conclusions, but 
considerable evidence indicates that minority group members get 
lower rewards than whites with identical promotion 
qualifications" (Baker et al., 1988, p.66).  Similarly, the 
disparity in status and income between many men and women can be 
attributed partly to the differences in their initial job 
placement.  Evidence also suggests that women "continue to suffer 
in the competition for promotions after placement" (Baker et al., 
1988, p.66).  It is always difficult to determine whether these 
groups actually face some form of institutionalized 
discrimination, or if the promotion models are missing some 
important variables associated with these demographic 
characteristics (so that this specification bias is incorrectly 
reflected in the demographic variables).  This problem is 
addressed in the thesis. 
c.   Organizational Variables 
Finally, organizational variables can affect the 
"promotablilty" of all employees within an organization. 
Structural characteristics may limit career progression.  For 
example, passage toward executive positions may be more open to 
certain specialties or functions than to others (Tremblay and 
Roger, 1993, p.418).  Another factor, which is also the topic of 
this study, is the rate of growth of the organization.  Rosenbaum 
conducted a study in which he analyzed this relationship between 
promotion patterns and increases or decreases in organizational 
growth.  It is no surprise that "the aggregate promotion rates 
for each level tend to correspond to the growth patterns for the 
company as a whole, albeit not perfectly" (Rosenbaum, 1979, 
p.36).  Although Rosenbaum's study did not examine any cases of 
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negative growth or "downsizing", it seems logical from his 
findings to assume that reductions in the absolute number of 
employees would result. 
C.   MINORITIES IN THE WORKPLACE 
1. Importance Of Minority Employment 
As mentioned earlier, the ethnic composition of 
American contemporary society is changing relatively rapidly. 
This change is being mirrored in all areas of employment as 
evidenced by the "emerging cultural pluralism found in the 
workplace" (Ramsey, 1993, p.9).  This is because employment is 
the predominant need for any adult immigrant.  Employment 
provides a means of survival and can also be an instrument thath 
either helps or hinders integration into society.  In this 
country, work achievement and the freedom to make career choices 
"have always been very highly valued. . . .Supporting values 
include the stress on democracy, freedom, equality, 
individualism, the future, progress, optimism, and the pursuit of 
happiness" (Almquist, 1979, p.10). 
2. Race Effects In Workplace Performance 
Historically, the popular explanation of the economic 
plight of black Americans has been based on a belief that race, 
per se, is a more important determinant of employment success 
than class (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1991, p.138).  In other 
words, it is argued that blacks have confronted discrimination 
primarily on the basis of their color.  A black sociologist, 
William Wilson, contends otherwise.  Wilson (1980) asserts that 
"class has become more important than race in determining black 
life-chances in the modern industrial period" (Wilson, 1980, 
p.150).  His key argument is that the fate of minority groups is 
increasingly dependent on their levels of education and their 
work skills.  Class (or socio-economic status) affects the 
capacity for people to educate themselves.  Therefore, many 
minority groups would appear to be discriminated against in the 
workplace even if all discriminatory practices related to racial 
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or ethnic status were eliminated.  This is because past 
discrimination has impaired their investment in human capital. 
On the other hand, many authors disagree with Wilson's 
argument.  According to Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1991, pp.138-9) 
the "mainstream position has been that race is of far more 
importance than class in understanding the situation of black 
Americans.  According to this view, blacks have faced deep-seated 
prejudices and discrimination simply because of their color, not 
because they were poor and lower class".  McConahay contends that 
many whites still harbor negative feelings towards blacks, but 
"it is still not fashionable to express these feelings directly" 
(McConahay, 1982, p.716). 
Gillian Stamp (1990) also describes a "Qualification 
Ceiling" which tends to impact strongly on racial/ethnic 
minorities.  She argues that this is a real phenomenom and that 
it is necessary "to make a very clear distinction between the 
intrinsic capability to carry responsibility at different levels 
of work and the abilities indicated by certificates" (Stamp, 
1990, p.13).  These findings have important implications on the 
specification of the promotion models in later chapters.  They 
suggest that a number of factors other than race need to be 
considered, if a realistic assessment of the effect of race and 
discrimination are to be estimated. 
3.   Race Effects In Performance Evaluations 
A number of studies have addressed the issue of how 
race can affect the performance ratings of workers.  Performance 
ratings are the most commonly used criteria in validation 
studies, yet they are highly vulnerable to rater effects such as 
leniency errors, halo errors, and central-tendency errors 
(Muchinsky, 1993, p.227).  Ford et al. (1986) found that whites 
"rated white ratees higher than black ratees, and black raters 
assigned higher ratings to blacks than to whites" (Ford et al., 
1986, p.330).  This seems fair, in a sense, because the bias 
works against all races.  However, the minority ratees are 
actually at a distinct disadvantage because they are far more 
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likely than whites to have a rater belonging to a different 
ethnic group.  This is confirmed by the results of a study that 
examined this relationship from the ratees' perspective.  The 
results of the study "support the hypothesis that people are more 
confident of ratings of people in their racial group than they 
are of ratings of other racial groups" (Schmitt and Lappin, 1980, 
p.434). 
It is interesting to note, however, that in a US Navy 
study, Abrahams et a1.(1977) found that their major hypothesis 
that "black and white classifiers would be differentially biased 
in their treatment of black and white recruits was not 
supported."  Similarly, in a longitudinal study of a large 
national sample, Shenhav (1992) examined the effects of workers' 
race on their entrance into managerial positions in public and 
private sector organizations.  Results suggested that "black 
workers had promotion advantages in both sectors" (Shenhav, 1992, 
p.889) . 
4.   Impact Of Discrimination 
Despite the best of intentions, however, there will 
always be some instances of discrimination whenever there is 
significant ethnic diversity in the workforce.  Anti- 
discrimination initiatives have helped corporate America to do a 
better job of hiring minorities, but these initiatives have only 
had a small impact on the promotion process.  Minorities (in this 
case, including women), constitute 65 percent of the total work 
force, yet only occupy about 5 percent of the top jobs 
(Stephenson and Krebs, 1993, p.66).  There is, conseguently, a 
guestion of ineguity here, regardless of whether or not promotion 
patterns are caused by overt racial discrimination.  The reality 
is that "statistics on the occupational status of racial minority 
groups suggest that race is a strong predictor of position in the 
labor market and career patterns" (Thomas and Alderfer, 1989, 
p.133).  Even high educational attainment does not prevent 
discrimination.  Asian-Americans are a case in point.  Compared 
with the total US population, Asian-Americans have a higher 
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percentage of graduates from high school (75 versus 67 percent) 
and college (33 versus 16 percent).  However, in 1990, the median 
earnings for Asian male high school graduates were only 79 
percent of the earnings for comparably gualified whites.  This 
gap narrowed to 90 percent for college graduates (Kim and Lewis, 
1994, p.286).  However, some of the disparity for recent 
immigrants may be due to differentials in educational 
credentials, job experience, and language proficiency, or other 
factors associated with the process of cultural assimilation. 
Although the barriers to many white, male-dominated 
professions are being removed, "the political atmosphere of some 
environments can preclude success for those newcomers" (Fairhurst 
and Snavely, 1983, p.292).  These minorities are freguently less 
likely than other employees to develop supportive relationships 
within an organization or to receive opportunities to enhance 
work-related skills.  These lost opportunities can diminish the 
effectiveness of the minority employees' job performance, by 
suppressing their ability, motivation, or both.  Minority members 
may "internalize an organization's negative evaluations of them 
and engage in 'self-limiting behaviors'—for example, refusing a 
challenging job assignment or declining an opportunity for 
additional training—that perpetuate performance differences 
between minority and nonminority employees" (Greenhaus et al., 
1990, p.66). 
5.   Ethnic Diversity And Productivity 
The fact that organizational constraints may have the 
effect of reducing the performance of minority employees raises 
the following question: What are the effects of increased 
minority hiring on an organization's productivity?  Silva and 
Jacobs (1993) conducted a study that addressed this question 
specifically.  The authors found that there was only a small net 
performance loss resulting from hiring more minorities in 
proportion to their representation of the total applicants. 
However, "increasing minority hiring to a level exceeding 
minority applicant representation led to a much larger 
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performance loss" (Silva and Jacobs, 1993, p.595).  For each 
minority employee'that is hired above their applicant 
representation, the mean performance of minority hires decreases 
by a larger amount, which suggests diminishing marginal 
productivity.  Silva and Jacobs suggest that organizations try to 
increase recruitment to obtain more guality minority applicants 
so as to "ensure promotability of minority hires at later stages 
in their careers" (Silva and Jacobs, 1993, p.599). 
D.   LESSONS LEARNED FROM CORPORATE DOWNSIZING EFFORTS 
Downsizing is the "systematic reduction of a workforce by an 
employer in a variety of ways, usually as a result of such 
developments as financial losses, cashflow difficulties, and 
technological changes.  Techniques used include hiring freezes, 
early retirement, transfers, and terminations" (Appelbaum et al., 
1987, p.68).  However, it is the latter that is typically 
associated with downsizing.  Downsizing has become one of the 
most prevalent major changes in U.S. organizations (Smeltzer and 
Zener, 1992, p.446).  According to Overman (1991, p.29), the 
"mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s, followed by recession in 
the early 1990s, have left the United States a legacy of layoffs 
. . . .Management has discovered with a vengeance that labor is a 
variable".  Downsizing and restructuring are designed to improve 
productivity and efficiency, yet they often have the opposite 
effect.  Many companies discover that they are in worse shape and 
respond by conducting more extensive downsizing and 
restructuring, "which places them in a vulnerable business 
situation" (Tjosvold, 1991, p.79). 
Consequently, a wealth of literature has evolved concerning 
the issue of downsizing.  It tends to concentrate on a number of 
major themes.  Bunning (1992), Greenberg (1991), and Smith (1994) 
discuss why downsizing has become so widespread in recent years 
and, in some cases, question whether it should be necessary at 
all (Faltermayer, 1992).  Most authors give some attention to how 
a downsizing program should be implemented.  However, Abler and 
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Marshall (1990), Feldman et al.(1993), Firstenberg (1993), and 
McLaughlin (1988) cover this in great detail—giving 
comprehensive step-by-step guides on how to manage the downsizing 
process. 
Other studies (notably Dichter and Trank, 1991; Harari, 
1992; Moravec et al., 1994; Weinstein and Leibman, 1991) 
concentrate on identifying the potential pitfalls of downsizing. 
Dichter and Trank (1991) examine the legal implications of 
downsizing, while the others relate the need for effective 
planning to minimize the potential problem areas. 
Another body of literature looks specifically at the impact 
of downsizing on organizational effectiveness and the morale of 
employees.  These authors (Bell, 1992; Byrne, 1994; Myers, 1993; 
Osborne, 1990: Sullivan and Silverstein, 1993; Yates, 1985; 
Zemke, 1990) point out that downsizing programs can have 
unintended conseguences on the productivity of the organization— 
particularly if the remaining employees feel insecure about their 
own job security. 
Finally, there are some authors who do not regard downsizing 
as the panacea, in all instances, for corporate American in the 
1990s.  Francis et al.(1992) and Porter and Kehoe (1993/94) 
describe cases of organizations that successfully reduced jobs 
and costs without laying off employees in the private and public 
sector, respectively.  Tomasko (1991) takes this even further. 
He develops a model in which different restructuring strategies 
are proposed, depending on the extent of the reduction in 
personnel that is reguired and the amount of time that is 
available for implementation. 
1.   How Minorities have Fared in Civilian Downsizing 
Efforts 
There is not much literature available that focuses on 
the effect of downsizing programs on minority employees.  One 
study, however, has been identified.  The U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) examined eight 1982 downsizing programs in eight 
federal agencies.  The main purpose of the study was to analyze 
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the savings and costs of the eight dowsizing efforts and provide 
a methodology for agencies to use to compare the potential fiscal 
impacts of downsizing and attrition when faced with the need to 
reduce staff size.  However, it also included a detailed analysis 
of the effects of the downsizing on the employment status of 
minorities (GAO, 1985). 
The GAO found that minorities were overrepresented 
among the employees affected by the downsizing programs (those 
who were separated, downgraded, reassigned, and transferred and 
who resigned and retired) in seven of the eight agencies. 
Attrition data for the 12 months prior to the downsizing programs 
were compared with data on separations generated by the 
downsizing in the six agencies from which data were available. 
It could then be determined whether attrition would have resulted 
in the separation of minorities at rates similar to those 
resulting from the downsizing.  In five of the six agencies, the 
downsizing resulted in a greater loss of minority employees than 
would have been expected from "normal" attrition (GAO, 1985, 
pp.47-49). 
It is also relevant for this thesis to note that in one 
agency, which employed fewer minorities than the other agencies, 
minorities were not adversely affected by the downsizing.  The 
GAO concluded, in part, that "this may be a function of the 
positions that were selected for abolition.  Men and non- 
minorities were disproportionately represented in these jobs" 
(GAO, 1985, p.49).  This suggests that the type of occupation in 
the military may have a bearing on how minority officers are 
affected by the military drawdown.  Similarly, the fact that 
minority employees have lower representation in some of the 
military services than in others connotes that the services may 
have varied success in shielding minorities from the effects of 
the drawdown. 
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2.   Other Impacts of Downsizing on the Recruitment and 
Promotion of Minorities 
When an organization and/or industry is downsizing, the 
internal labor market changes as a surplus of labor is created. 
Employers can be a lot more selective about which employees they 
keep and who they hire in the future.  The easiest way to be more 
selective is to raise eligibility reguirements.  It is therefore 
appropriate to consider the impact of eligibility reguirements on 
minorities. 
This is the focus of a study by Steinberg et al.(1990) 
in which they examine managerial promotions in the public sector. 
They find that the main barrier to the promotion of minorities is 
eligibility reguirements.  Furthermore, job titles which gualify 
incumbents to apply to take examinations for managerial positions 
are disproportionately held by white employees.  Conseguently, 
although minorities represented 20.5 percent of the New York 
state labor force in 1979, only 6.6 percent of minority employees 
were in managerial positions (Steinberg et al., 1990, pp.296- 
298).  These trends would only worsen in a downsizing 
environment, as workers even have to compete to keep their 
current jobs. 
Because blacks and other minorities generally score 
lower on standardized tests, the use or increase of categorical 
cut-offs in the military would result in "clearly a racially 
disparate impact" (Conciatore, 1990, p.26).  Cox (1990, p.96) 
supports this view, contending that while "the economic realities 
of a cutback in military personnel. . .will no doubt mean 
stronger academic preparation as a criterion for entrance, 
hopefully, the Department of Defense will not repeat academia's 
mistake: relying on an arbitrary, controversial method as the 
chief means for evaluating competency." 
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E.   THE MILITARY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE CONCERNING THE 
PROMOTION OF MINORITIES 
There is a substantial body of literature concerning 
minority employment issues in the military.  But it is also 
important to acknowledge the context of the military drawdown. 
DoD is in the midst of a major restructuring which will result in 
a fundamental change in the way it conducts its business.  Now 
that the cold war is over, the task of downsizing DoD "carries 
with it a significant challenge—making certain, as we bring down 
the size of our armed forces and their supporting institutions, 
that we protect this nation's ability to deter aggression and, if 
required, to fight and prevail in future conflicts" (Atwood, 
1992, p.15). 
This process is being driven by the desire of both the U.S. 
Congress and the American public to see "the so-called economic 
peace dividend kick in after the dismantling of communism in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" (Ettorre, 1992, p.20). 
Although force reduction actually began in 1990, most of the 
earlier downsizing was accomplished through attrition and reduced 
recruiting.  However, because the U.S. "has had an all-volunteer 
force since 1974, managing this drawdown is far more complicated 
than the demobilizations that followed World War II or Vietnam" 
(Van Voorst, 1992, p.30).  The officers in the military are now 
more career-oriented than were their predecessors in the 
aforementioned campaigns.  Researchers agree that this change 
from conscription to a voluntary military system transformed both 
the cultural definition of military service and the 
organizational outcomes of that transformation (Stewart and 
Firestone, 1992, p.436). 
1.   Minorities in the Military 
The military has sought to maintain its image as an 
employer that promotes equal opportunity for all racial groups. 
It is ironic that the military—purportedly one of the most 
conservative institutions in America—has been at the forefront 
of the movement to establish equal opportunity.  In the past, 
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though, blacks have been "totally excluded from military service, 
excluded from combat specialties, excluded from being 
commissioned as officers, been subject to racial quotas, and 
segregated in black units" (Segal and Nordlie, 1979, p.135).  The 
significant progress that has been achieved since President 
Truman's 1948 executive order establishing equality of 
opportunity in the military has been attributed to its rigidly 
hierarchical and highly regimented organizational structure. 
This structure ensures strict obedience to command and, 
therefore, makes it less difficult to order desegregation or 
equal treatment than in the civilian sector (Butler and Holmes, 
1981, p.17). 
2.   Military Promotion Studies 
Consequently, the military has focused a lot of 
attention on the study of its promotion systems to assess the key 
determinants of promotion.  For example, a study of Marine Corps 
promotion found that the "factors that significantly impacted 
performance at all steps through selection to major were 
commissioning source, GCT score and composite third standing at 
the basic school. . . .success was independent of race" (Hamm, 
1993).  Similarly, another study examined the effect of variables 
independent of performance on promotion in the Marine Corps.  It 
found that the most significant variables were marital status, 
attendance at an appropriate level professional school, 
attainment of a graduate degree, and, to a lesser extent, 
occupation and commissioning source.  Race was one of the most 
notable factors not having a significant effect on promotion 
(Long, 1992). 
A Navy study found that for Surface Warfare Officers 
(SWOs), having a high undergraduate GPA, a graduate degree, more 
than three additional qualification designators (AQDs), and 
having been screened for command each have a significant positive 
effect on the probability of promotion (Woo, 1993).  Minority 
status was not mentioned.  Baldwin and Rothwell (1993) examined 
Air Force promotion and found that minorities are not promoted at 
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the same rate as white officers, but that the differences 
decrease as rank in the Air Force increases.  They also concluded 
that minorities experience lower promotion probabilities in the 
Air Force because their records are not as promotable.  Baldwin 
and Rothwell could not quantify this effect because they were not 
holding other personal variables (such as performance and 
education) constant. 
A couple of other military promotion studies deserve 
particular attention because the specification of their promotion 
models provide a useful guide for this thesis.  The first is 
Cymrot's 1986 study that examined the relationship between 
graduate education and the promotion of Naval officers.  He 
proposed that there are "three types of variables that are used 
to explain promotion: personal characteristics, previous 
experiences and performance indicators, and Navy structural 
variables" (Cymrot, 1986).  The former group included age, sex, 
race and graduate education variables.  The inclusion of 
variables other than graduate education was made to adjust for 
these other factors that might influence promotion.  Cymrot found 
that race did not have a consistent impact on promotion. 
The second study was produced by Stewart and Firestone 
(1992) who, in part, considered the promotion of minority 
officers across DoD.  The specification of their basic model 
accounted for the service (Army was the reference service group), 
race (white was the reference racial/ethnic group), and a vector 
of dummy variables reflecting each of the cohort years.  They 
used this and other models to conclude that "while retention 
rates for minorities appear high, little change in the 
demographic composition of higher grades is likely if current 
recruitment, and promotion practices continue" (Stewart and 
Firestone, 1992, p.435). 
All of the promotion studies discussed above have been 
drawn upon in the specification of the promotion models in 
Chapter v.     Other relevant studies in the literature include 
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Bertolino (1990), Brown et al.(1984), Rupinski (1987), Santens 
and Walker (1983), and Werkhaven (1993). 
F.   DEFICIENCIES IN THE LITERATURE 
The literature does not, as previously mentioned, 
specifically address the issue of minority officer promotion 
during a military drawdown.  However, this omission is simply a 
function of time, as there has not been a significant number of 
minority officers in the U.S. military during any previous 
military drawdowns.  It is unfair to criticize the literature on 
these grounds.  What is important, is the fact that there has 
been extensive research into a range of issues surrounding 
minorities, and their promotion, in the workplace.  Downsizing 
strategies have received similar attention. 
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IV.  ETHNIC REPRESENTATION AND OCCUPATIONAL TRENDS 
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA: OFFICER MASTER FILES 
The research utilizes data provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC), Monterey.  The data cover all services for 
the years 1987 through 1994, inclusive.  Cross-sectional (point- 
in-time) profiles of the officer corps of each service are 
developed.  These profiles are based on DMDC's Officer Master 
Files and permit an appraisal of the representation of minorities 
by paygrade, community, service, and other relevant dimensions 
before the drawdown and during the early and mid-drawdown 
periods.  This provides a useful means of identifying broad 
trends associated with the employment of minority officers 
throughout the drawdown.  This information also provides 
direction and focus for the subsequent statistical modeling and 
analysis. 
B. DATA RESTRICTIONS 
A number of restrictions are placed on the officer master 
files (OMF) in order to generate output in accordance with the 
specifications outlined above.  First, only four variables have 
been retained.  These are DPOC (occupation code), SVC (service), 
RETH (ethnicity), and PG (paygrade).  Second, three further 
restrictions are placed upon the file: 
a. RETH must to have a valid value. 
b. PG must have a valid entry and be greater than 20 (0-1 
or greater) because this analysis is only concerned 
with officer promotion. 
c. SVC must be less than five, which deletes Coast Guard 
officers from the sample (Coast Guard officers are 
included in the officer master files only from 1989 
onwards). 
The effect of these restrictions on the number of officers in the 
officer master files is displayed in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  Number of Officers in Officer Master Files (OMF), 
Before and After Restrictions, 1987-1994 
OMF   A. Total Number 
Year     of Officers 
B. Restricted Number 
of Officers 
1987 307,795 286,884 
1988 304,973 284,540 
1989 309,665 282,885 
1990 303,711 276,645 
1991 297,872 270,431 
1992 280,901 254,653 
1993 264,551 238,624 
1994 253,273 227,801 
Difference 









Source:  Derived from data provided by Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC). 
The impact of the restrictions on the size of the sample is 
minimal—particularly when one considers that approximately 20 
percent of the reduction can be attributed to non-DoD Coast Guard 
officers, whose absence does not harm the sample for this study 
at all.  The restricted sample provides ample observations for 
the analysis and is still fully representative of the various 
demographic groups. 
C.   DEFINITIONS OF DOD OCCUPATION CODES 
The DOD occupation codes used in this research are taken 
from the "Semi-Annual Occupational Profile of Minorities and 
Women in the Department of Defense," prepared by the Defense 
Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI).  The occupational 
variables in the DMDC files are grouped according to the first 
character in the field to create the occupation codes. 
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Consequently, nine single digit occupational codes are presented, 
as defined by DEOMI (1994): 
1. General officers and executives (includes all officers 
of general/flag rank and all commanders, directors, and planners 
not elsewhere classified). 
2. Tactical operations officers (includes pilots and crews 
and operations staff officers). 
3. Intelligence officers (includes strategic, general, and 
technical intelligence gathering, analysis, interpretation, and 
summary). 
4. Engineering and maintenance officers (includes design, 
development, production, and maintenance engineering officers). 
5. Scientists and professionals (indues physical, 
biological, and social scientists, and other professionals such 
as lawyers and chaplains). 
6. Medical officers (includes physicians, dentists, 
nurses, veterinarians, and closely allied professional medical 
service officers). 
7. Administrators (includes general and specialized 
administration and management officers). 
8. Supply, procurement, and allied officers (includes 
officers in supply, procurement and production, transportation, 
food service, and related logistics activities not elsewhere 
classified). 
9. Non-occupational (includes patients, students, 
trainees, and other officers who for various reasons are not 
occupationally qualified). 
Abbreviations of these occupation codes are presented in the 
tables below. 
D.   PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1.   Distribution of Officers Across DoD 
Tables 5,6 and 7 show various aspects of the 
distribution of officers across the services.  It is important to 
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distinguish between the services because they all have different 
promotion policies and minimum time-in-rank criteria.  Panel A of 
Table 5 shows the numerical distribution of all officers by 
service and by year.  All of the services have experienced 
absolute reductions in their officer strength.  The overall 
reduction in officer strength amounts to 59,803 or 20.6 percent 
during the drawdown.  However, this burden has not been shared 
evenly.  This disparity is illustrated in the percentages 
provided in panel B of Table 5.  The Air Force and Army have both 
suffered proportional reductions in their officer strength, while 
the Navy and Marine Corps have grown in relative terms.  This 
suggests that the effect of the drawdown on officer promotions 
might vary by service. 
The next point of interest is to consider changes in 
the distribution of officers by racial group throughout the 
drawdown.  This is displayed in Table 6.  Again, the reduction in 
officer strength has not occurred evenly across racial groups. 
The data show that, throughout the drawdown, the proportion of 
white officers has fallen, while the proportions of all minority 
groups have risen.  However, it is difficult to determine what 
role the drawdown, per se, has had on these trends.  All that can 
be assumed with confidence, at this point, is that the drawdown 
does not appear to have adversely affected the representation of 
minority officers.  Likewise, promotion outcomes cannot be 
determined from these data—suffice it to say that they are 
likely to be different across the racial groups. 
Table 7 presents the distribution of officers by 
racial/ethnic group across the services.  It can be calculated 
from Table 7 that the number of minority officers in DoD has only 
decreased by 195 (or 0.6 percent) during the drawdown (compared 
with 20.6 percent for all officers).  The services with the most 
minority officers (Army and Air Force) experienced small 
reductions in their minority officer strength.  Conversely, the 
Navy and Marine Corps increased their share of DoD minority 
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Table 5.  Distribution of Officers by Service, 
1987-1994 
A. Number 
Fiscal Army Navy Marine Air Total 
Year Corps Force 
1987 93,098 67,727 18,729 107,330 286,884 
1988 92,125 68,740 18,558 105,117 284,540 
1989 91,788 68,938 18,465 103,694 282,885 
1990 89,602 68,896 18,104 100,043 276,645 
1991 88,653 67,406 17,774 96,598 270,431 
1992 81,305 65,706 17,270 90,372 254,653 
1993 74,929 63,084 16,545 84,066 238,624 
1994 72,203 58,661 16,002 80,935 227,801 
B. Percentage 
Fiscal Army Navy Marine Air Total 
Year Corps Force 
1987 32.5 23.6 6.5 37.4 100.0 
1988 32.4 24.2 6.5 36.9 100.0 
1989 32.4 24.4 6.5 36.7 100.0 
1990 32.4 24.9 6.5 36.2 100.0 
1991 32.8 24.9 6.6 35.7 100.0 
1992 31.9 25.8 6.8 35.5 100.0 
1993 31.4 26.4 6.9 35.3 100.0 
1994 31.7 25.8 7.0 35.5 100.0 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
39 





White Black Hispanic  Other Total 
1987 256,018 18,611 5,028 7,227 286,884 
1988 253,037 18,786 5,203 7,514 284,540 
1989 250,391 19,092 5,537 7,865 282,885 
1990 243,647 19,107 5,705 8,186 276,645 
1991 237,101 19,082 5,810 8,438 270,431 
1992 222,303 18,173 5,807 8,370 254,653 
1993 207,824 16,715 5,768 8,317 238,624 
1994 197,130 16,367 5,862 8,442 227,801 
B. Percentage 
Fiscal White Black Hispanic Other Total 
Year 
1987 89.2 6.5 1.8 2.5 100.0 
1988 88.9 6.6 1.8 2.7 100.0 
1989 88.5 6.7 2.0 2.8 100.0 
1990 88.1 6.9 2.0 3.0 100.0 
1991 87.7 7.1 2.1 3.1 100.0 
1992 87.3 7.1 2.3 3.3 100.0 
1993 87.1 7.0 2.4 3.5 100.0 
1994 86.5 7.2 2.6 3.7 100.0 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
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Table 7.  Distribution of Minority Officers by Service, 
1987-1994 
A. Number 
Fiscal Army Navy Marine Air Total 
Year Corps Force 
1987 13,646 5,236 1,454 10,530 30,866 
1988 13,899 5,575 1,515 10,514 31,503 
1989 14,326 5,850 1,654 10,664 32,494 
1990 14,548 6,263 1,649 10,538 32,998 
1991 14,826 6,433 1,656 10,415 33,330 
1992 14,204 6,624 1,657 9,865 32,350 
1993 13,202 6,725 1,629 9,244 30,800 









1987 44.2 17.0 4.7 34.1 100.0 
1988 44.1 17.7 4.8 33.4 100.0 
1989 44.1 18.0 5.1 32.8 100.0 
1990 44.1 19.0 5.0 31.9 100.0 
1991 44.5 19.3 5.0 31.2 100.0 
1992 43.9 20.5 5.1 30.5 100.0 
1993 42.9 21.8 5.3 30.0 100.0 
1994 43.1 21.7 5.4 29.8 100.0 
Note:  Minority officers include persons identified as black, 
Hispanic, or from another "non-white" racial/ethnic group. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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officers in both relative and absolute terms.  This may be partly 
attributed to the fact that because of their greater numbers, 
minority officers in the Army and Air Force are actually less of 
a "minority" group strictly speaking.  Consequently, there may 
have been more pressure on the Navy and Marine Corps to increase 
their minority representation. 
2.   Distribution of Minority Officers by Paygrade 
Success in the military is generally associated with 
being promoted into the senior ranks.  In fact, much of the 
justification for affirmative action policies is based on the 
perceived need to have minorities sharing positions of power. 
Successful minorities can act as "role models" for younger 
minority workers and, more importantly, alter the corporate 
culture and minimize the institutional bias that may surround the 
organization's hiring and promotion practices.  Representation, 
on its own, is not enough if most of the minority officers are 
clustered in the junior ranks. 
Consequently, an analysis of the representation of 
minorities at each paygrade throughout the drawdown gives an 
added insight into the impact of the drawdown on the promotion of 
minority officers.  Table 8 presents this distribution across 
DoD. 
It can be seen in Table 8 that minority officers are 
generally over-represented in the junior paygrades (0-1 to 0-3) 
and under-represented in the more senior paygrades, when compared 
with their total representation.  However, this imbalance is 
gradually being redressed.  Total minority representation and the 
representation of minorities at each paygrade have increased 
throughout the drawdown.  It is significant that, by 1994, 
minority representation at 0-4 reached the level of total 
representation.  Furthermore, representation at 0-5 almost 
doubled during this period and is now poised to reach 
proportional representation in the next four or five years.  The 
biggest constraint to achieving equal minority representation in 
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Table 8.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Paygrade, 1987-1994 
All Services 
Paygrade 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
0-1 12.4 12.8 14.2 14.9 15.0 14.8 15.5 17.3 
0-2 12.8 13.2 13.2 14.0 14.7 15.6 15.5 15.7 
0-3 13.0 13.2 13.4 13.6 13.8 13.9 13.8 13.9 
0-4 8.4 9.0 9.8 10.5 11.3 12.2 12.8 13.5 
0-5 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.5 7.2 8.0 8.8 9.8 
0-6 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.2 
0-7 to 0-10 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.6 5.2 5.4 5.8 5.8 
TOTAL 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.9 12.3 12.7 12.9 13.5 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
the senior ranks is the fact that it takes many years of work 
experience to reach the grade of 0-5 and beyond.  Minority 
officers must work through the pipeline before being eligible for 
these promotions.  However, at the DoD level, it appears that the 
distribution of minority officers across the paygrades has become 
more equitable during the drawdown.  These trends are now 
examined by service. 
Table 9 presents these data for the Army.  The Army has 
the largest number and percentage of minority officers of all of 
the services.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the Army's 
trends are similar (if even a little more extensive in terms of 
representation) than those that apply to DoD.  Proportional 
representation (when the representation within a grade matches 
the total representation of a minority) in the grade of 0-4 was 
achieved in 1993 and significant inroads into the representation 
at the 0-5 level were made throughout the period. 
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Table 9.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Paygrade, 1987-1994 
Army 
Paygrade 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
0-1 16.9 17.4 17.9 18.2 18.4 17.9 17.4 19.0 
0-2 17.8 17.9 17.8 19.0 19.2 20.7 19.9 21.2 
0-3 17.7 18.1 18.9 19.4 19.9 20.0 19.8 19.8 
0-4 11.3 12.0 12.7 13.7 15.0 16.7 18.0 19.1 
0-5 7.3 7.6 7.7 8.6 9.4 11.1 12.3 13.3 
0-6 7.9 7.9 8.1 7.9 8.1 8.5 9.0 9.1 
0-7 to 0-10 8.1 8.4 7.6 8.1 8.5 9.3 9.1 8.4 
TOTAL 14.7 15.1 15.6 16.2 16.7 17.5 17.6 18.3 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
The same cannot be said for the Navy and Marine Corps 
(Tables 10 and 11, respectively).  Proportional representation 
has only been maintained in the grades of 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3 in 
both cases—outcomes that had already been achieved prior to the 
drawdown.  Although the Navy and Marine Corps approximately 
doubled their minority representation at 0-5 and 0-6, they still 
face a problem, particularly in the case of the Marine Corps. 
Minority representation in 0-4 was almost stagnant throughout the 
period and nearly overtaken by representation at the 0-5 level. 
This casts doubt over the services' ability to sustain increases 
in 0-5 and 0-6 representation without compromising promotion 
standards or introducing fixed quotas for minorities. 
This failure of the Navy and Marine Corps to make 
significant inroads into minority representation at the grade of 
0-4 is a point of concern.  If minority officers are failing to 
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Table 10.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Paygrade, 1987-1994 
Navy 
Paygrade 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
0-1 10.6 10.2 12.0 14.3 14.7 14.8 15.9 18.2 
0-2 10.2 11.0 10.8 10.6 12.3 14.0 14.7 14.5 
0-3 8.5 9.2 9.3 10.0 10.2 10.8 11.7 12.3 
0-4 6.2 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.5 7.8 8.8 
0-5 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.9 5.3 6.0 6.6 6.8 
0-6 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 
0-7 to 0-10 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 
TOTAL 7.7 8.1 8.5 9.1 9.5 10.1 10.7 11.4 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
Table 11.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Paygrade, 1987-1994 
Marine Corps 
Paygrade 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
0-1 12.2 12.9 14.0 13.7 11.9 12.5 14.1 16.3 
0-2 9.9 11.2 12.6 12.3 13.3 13.1 12.2 12.1 
0-3 6.8 7.2 7.8 8.9 9.1 9.6 10.0 10.8 
0-4 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.7 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.6 
0-5 3.0 3.2 3.7 5.6 4.4 4.9 5.7 6.4 
0-6 1.9 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.3 3.7 4.5 
0-7 to 0-10 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 
TOTAL 7.8 8.2 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.6 9.8 10.4 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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make 0-4, then they are also failing to make a career in the 
services.  Similarly, this promotion point provides a filter that 
makes it very difficult for the Navy and Marine Corps to satisfy 
representation goals at higher levels, as evidenced by the 
decline in flag-level minority officers throughout the drawdown. 
This is particularly important in light of the Navy Secretary's 
stated objective of the Navy achieving population representation 
for minorities within its officer ranks by the year 2001 (Fuentes 
and Pexton, 1994). 
The distribution of minority officers in the Air Force 
throughout the drawdown is displayed in Table 12.  These outcomes 
are quite favorable.  Proportional representation for the grade 
of 0-4 was achieved in 1990, and significant progress has been 
made toward achieving this balance for 0-5.  It can be argued 
that the Air Force's distribution of minority officers by 
paygrade is more equitable than that of the Army.  However, it is 
Table 12.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Paygrade, 1987-1994 
Air Force 
Paygrade        1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
0-1 10.1 11.2 12.0 11.7 11.8 11.8 13.3 14.6 
0-2 10.5 10.3 10.4 11.9 11.9 11.4 11.8 12.0 
0-3 12.5 12.3 12.1 11.8 11.9 11.8 11.3 11.0 
0-4 7.7 8.7 9.9 10.7 11.3 12.4 12.7 13.0 
0-5 5.3 5.2 5.5 6.2 6.8 7.3 7.8 9.3 
0-6 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.7 
0-7 to  0-10 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.4 5.8 
TOTAL 9.8 10.0 10.3 10.5 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.3 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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important to note that it is only the Army that is even close to 
achieving population representation for minorities (defined as 
approximately 13 percent, the proportion of blacks in the U.S. 
population) within its officer ranks.  As the other services try 
to raise their overall representation of minorities by 
commissioning more minorities at the 0-1 level, they will 
continue to face problems in maintaining an equitable 
distribution across all of their rank levels because of the time- 
lags involved. 
3.   Distribution of Minority Officers by Occupation 
The occupational groups in DoD vary in size, 
organizational structure, retention behavior (driven by 
differences in civilian employability and the arduousness of the 
military occupations), accession requirements, promotion 
requirements, and promotion philosophy.  For example, the Navy 
promotes strictly to fill vacancies within occupational areas 
(communities), whereas the Air Force and Army promote according 
to merit across occupations.  It is therefore logical that 
promotion rates differ by occupational groups and that success 
across the groups is governed by different characteristics. 
Consequently, minority promotions during the drawdown may have 
been affected by their occupational status.  This hypothesis is 
explored further in the following tables. 
Table 13 displays the percentages of officers in each 
occupation that are minorities for all services.  It shows that 
the occupational representation of minority officers was stable 
throughout the drawdown.  For the purposes of this study, the DoD 
occupations "general" and "non-occupation" can be ignored; the 
former because officers of general/flag rank are not relevant to 
an analysis of promotion to 0-4, and the latter because it gives 
no information about the officers' employment.  The four 
occupations (supply, administration, health, and engineer/ 
maintenance) with the highest levels of participation of minority 
officers in 1987 still had the highest participation in 1994. 
Minority officers were thus overrepresented in these four 
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occupations.  However, minority participation in every 
occupational group increased between 1987 and 1994.  The 
percentage growth was the greatest in administration (34.0 
percent), intelligence (33.7 percent), and engineer/maintenance 
(31.0 percent).  Although minorities are only 10.0 percent of 
tactical operations officers, other data (Tables 18-22 below) 
show that, because this is such a large occupational category, it 
is actually the occupation with the largest number of minority 
officers.  The effect of this occupational mix on minority 
promotion rates is analysed in the promotion models in Chapter 
VI. 
Table 13.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
All Services 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.4 
Tactical 8.5 8.3 8.6 8.8 9.2 9.4 9.5 10.0 
Intelligence 8.9 9.3 10.2 10.9 11.5 12.0 12.1 12.9 
Eng & Maint 11.6 13.7 14.1 14.4 14.7 15.2 15.1 15.2 
Sei & Prof 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.4 11.2 
Health 12.6 12.7 13.1 13.7 14.0 14.4 15.0 15.6 
Admin 14.7 17.1 17.4 17.9 18.4 18.9 18.9 19.7 
Supply 17.2 16.5 17.1 17.8 18.4 18.7 18.6 19.3 
Non-occ 8.4 9.8 10.8 11.7 12.3 12.7 13.7 14.6 
TOTAL 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.9 12.3 12.7 12.9 13.5 
Source:  Derived from data p rovided by DMDC. 
Representation statistics on minority officers by 
occupation in the Army are presented in Table 14.  Although the 
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participation rates of minorities are higher in the Army than in 
the other services, the trends and areas of overrepresentation 
throughout the drawdown are very similar to those shown for DoD 
in Table 13.  The main difference is the much smaller percentage 
of Army minority officers who are classified as "non-occupation". 
This may reflect the fact that Army officers generally undergo 
shorter periods of specialized training than officers from other 
services; or that, even while Army officers are in training, they 
are classified in the occupation for which they are being 
trained. 
Table 14.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 




1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
General 8.1 8.3 7.6 8.1 8.5 9.2 9.1 8.4 
Tactical 12.3 12.4 12.7 13.2 13.5 13.8 13.8 14.6 
Intelligence 9.6 10.4 12.1 13.4 14.3 14.9 14.9 15.5 
Eng & Maint 19.1 21.5 21.3 21.8 22.5 24.1 23.1 23.1 
Sei St Prof 10.4 10.9 11.1 11.3 11.4 11.6 11.9 12.9 
Health 14.2 14.5 15.1 16.0 16.7 17.6 18.5 19.7 
Admin 20.3 21.1 21.6 22.4 23.3 24.8 24.8 25.7 
Supply 22.7 23.4 23.9 25.0 25.3 25.6 25.1 25.2 
Non-occ 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 14.7 15.1 15.6 16.2 16.7 17.5 17.6 18.3 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
Table 15 shows the minority officer occupational 
participation rates for the Navy.  It can be seen that minority 
officers in the Navy are spread fairly evenly across the seven 
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major occupations throughout the drawdown.  In fact, minority 
officers are at, or slightly above, proportional representation 
in five occupations in 1987 and four occupations in 1994 — with 
the next two occupations (engineer/maintenance and intelligence) 
being only marginally below.  It is therefore expected that 
occupational variables will have less influence over promotion 
outcomes for minorities in the Navy because there is less 
variation in these variables. 
Table 15.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Navy 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 
Tactical 6.1 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.7 7.2 7.8 8.0 
Intelligence 4.9 5.3 5.8 7.1 8.0 8.7 9.4 10.7 
Eng & Maint 7.3 7.2 7.7 8.2 8.5 9.1 9.7 10.6 
Sei & Prof 8.1 10.7 10.5 10.9 11.9 11.9 12.1 12.6 
Health 11.1 11.3 11.1 11.6 11.8 12.1 12.6 13.3 
Admin 8.6 12.2 12.7 13.4 14.2 15.2 16.2 17.1 
Supply 10.0 9.1 9.9 10.9 11.8 13.0 14.8 16.5 
Non-occ 0.0 9.9 11.1 12.6 13.3 13.7 13.8 15.3 
TOTAL 7.3 8.1 8.5 9.1 9.5 10.1 10.7 11.4 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
The Marine Corps and Air Force occupational 
participation rates for minority officers are shown in Tables 16 
and 17, respectively.  In contrast to the situation in the Navy, 
minority officers in the Marine Corps are overrepresented in only 
two occupations during this period—supply and administration. 
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They have no representation at all in the health occupation in 
any of the years under review.  The Marine Corps does not employ 
officers in the health area because the Navy provides the Marine 
Corps with medical support. 
Table 16.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Marine Corps 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.7 3.3 4.1 
Tactical 5.7 6.2 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.9 
Intelligence 6.4 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.2 7.3 8.0 9.4 
Eng & Maint 9.6 9.6 10.2 10.0 10.3 10.3 9.8 9.9 
Sei & Prof 6.1 6.6 7.5 7.9 7.3 9.5 9.4 9.7 
Health * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Admin 12.4 12.5 12.8 12.6 14.4 14.7 16.0 16.8 
Supply 13.2 13.5 14.5 14.7 15.6 15.7 16.0 16.4 
Non-occ 10.9 11.8 14.1 12.3 12.0 12.4 14.3 15.3 
TOTAL 7.8 8.2 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.6 9.8 10.4 
* The Navy provides the Marine Corps with medical support. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
In the Air Force, however, the outcome is very similar 
to the Navy with minority officers maintaining proportional 
representation across five of the seven occupations throughout 
most years of the drawdown (see Table 17).  The occupational 
trends in the Air Force have been relatively stable over the 
period.  The representation of minority officers is particularly 
high in administration and supply.  This has been a common 
finding for DoD and all of the individual military services. 
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Consequently, the promotion rates of these occupations are 
analysed further in this study. 
Table 17.  Minorities as a Percentage of Commissioned Officers, 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Air Force 
DOD 1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Occupation 
General 4.0 2.1 1.8 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.4 3.2 
Tactical 6.2 6.4 6.7 6.9 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.6 
Intelligence 10.3 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4 11.1 
Eng & Maint 10.8 12.5 12.8 13.0 13.3 13.6 13.5 13.5 
Sei & Prof 8.8 7.6 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.7 
Health 11.3 11.6 12.0 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.7 12.7 
Admin 16.2 17.1 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 16.8 17.4 
Supply 15.2 14.4 14.6 15.0 15.2 15.0 14.6 15.3 
Non-occ 6.9 7.9 7.7 8.4 8.8 8.9 12.4 10.3 
TOTAL 9.8 10.0 10.3 10.5 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.3 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
The occupational analysis conducted thus far has been 
concerned only with the proportion of officers in each 
occupational category that are minorities.  These figures can be 
somewhat misleading because they give no indication of the size 
of each occupational group.  Consequently, if minorities are 
slightly underrepresented in a large occupational group and 
overrepresented in a small occupational group, there could be 
some confusion surrounding the relative importance of these 
occupations to the minorities.  The following tables look only at 
the minority officers and present their distribution between the 
occupations to put this size dimension into perspective. 
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The distribution of minority officers by occupation is 
provided in Table 18.  It gives a different impression of the 
relative importance of the occupations for the minority officers 
compared to that in Table 13.  For example, in Table 13, minority 
officers were proportionately underrepresented in tactical 
operations, comprising approximately nine percent of the officer 
strength in that occupation.  However, Table 18 shows that, 
throughout the drawdown, approximately 30 percent of minority 
officers have been employed in tactical operations—making it the 
singularly most important occupational category for minority 
officers.  Conversely, although minority officers have been over- 
represented in supply and administration, it can be seen in Table 
18 that these occupations only combined to employ about 22 
percent of minority officers in 1994.  Health is reflected as an 
Table 18.  Percent Distribution of Minority Commissioned Officers 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
All Services 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Tactical 30.0 31.8 31.1 30.6 30.6 30.1 29.5 29.0 
Intelligence 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.7 
Eng & Maint 16.1 15.0 15.1 14.4 14.2 13.9 13.5 13.7 
Sei & Prof 4.5 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 
Health 16.4 17.1 17.3 18.3 18.5 19.6 20.9 21.4 
Admin 16.0 11.5 11.0 10.7 10.6 10.4 9.9 9.8 
Supply 11.3 12.4 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.9 12.7 12.5 
Non-occ 1.4 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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increasingly important occupation for minority officers during 
this period. 
These findings related to the distribution of minority 
officers by occupation across DoD almost exactly mirror the 
conclusions that can be drawn for the Army from Table 19. 
Although the percentage of minority officers employed in tactical 
operations declined during the drawdown, it is still the largest 
employer with 31 percent of minorities assigned there.  The 
proportion of the Army's minority officers employed in health 
grew markedly to 24.5 percent, while administration and supply 
remained fairly steady at a combined 22.8 percent.  This 
information facilitates a much more specific and relevant 
analysis of occupational promotion rates and their effect on 
Table 19.  Percent Distribution of Minority Commissioned Officers 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Army 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Tactical 37.5 37.3 35.6 34.3 33.6 32.5 31.0 31.3 
Intelligence 3.7 4.0 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 
Eng & Maint 14.2 13.7 14.1 13.5 13.1 12.8 12.8 12.5 
Sei & Prof 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.6 2.8 
Health 18.0 18.2 18.6 19.6 20.1 22.0 24.0 24.5 
Admin 10.0 9.7 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.7 
Supply 13.8 14.1 14.7 14.7 15.0 15.3 14.7 14.1 
Non-occ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
54 
minorities later in this study.  For example, if the promotion 
rates for scientists and professionals were found to be low, it 
could be concluded that this is of little concern to the 
promotion of minorities because less than three percent of 
minorities are employed in that occupation. 
The Navy data on the distribution of minority officers 
by occupation in Table 20 are also fairly similar to those of DoD 
and the Army.  Tactical operations is the largest occupation, 
employing 28.2 percent of minority officers in 1994.  The key 
difference is that this represents significant growth from only 
18.1 percent in 1987 (opposite direction to that in the other 
services).  Health again grew to about 23 percent, but 
administration and supply contracted from almost 26 percent to 
about 17 percent. 
Table 20.  Percent Distribution of Minority Commissioned Officers 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Navy 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 2.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Tactical 18.1 28.6 29.2 28.7 28.9 29.4 30.1 28.2 
Intelligence 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.3 
Eng & Maint 22.8 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.6 9.2 
Sei & Prof 9.5 5.1 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 
Health 19.1 21.5 20.6 21.0 20.9 21.2 21.9 22.9 
Admin 18.0 8.9 8.6 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 7.8 
Supply 7.7 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.4 8.6 9.0 9.3 
Non-occ 0.0 18.0 18.4 18.9 18.2 16.9 14.7 14.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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The distribution of minority officers by occupation in 
the Marine Corps is presented in Table 21.  In this case, 
tactical operations dominates the other occupations by employing 
approximately 40 percent of minority officers throughout the 
drawdown.  Another significant difference in the Marine Corps is 
the fact that no minority officers at all are employed in the 
health occupations because medical support is provided by the 
Navy.  This is an occupation that employs almost 25 percent of 
minority officers in the other services, so it changes the 
occupational distribution in the Marine Corps markedly. 
Administration and supply eased down from 30.5 percent in 1987 to 
27.9 percent in 1994—the largest of the four services.  The 
Table 21.  Percent Distribution of Minority Commissioned Officers 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Marine Corps 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 
Tactical 39.1 40.8 39.1 40.6 40.7 40.6 40.5 40.3 
Intelligence 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.1 
Eng & Maint 9.2 8.8 8.4 7.9 7.7 7.1 6.3 6.1 
Sei & Prof 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.6 
Health * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Admin 11.6 10.7 10.1 10.7 10.6 10.1 10.8 10.2 
Supply 18.9 18.8 18.2 19.8 20.5 19.4 18.6 17.7 
Non-occ 15.5 15.2 18.8 15.8 15.5 16.5 17.1 18.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* The Navy provides the Marine Corps with medical support. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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other occupations have an almost negligible contribution to the 
employment of minority officers. 
Finally, the occupational distribution of minority 
officers in the Air Force (see Table 22) is a little different 
than that in the other services.  Although tactical operations is 
the largest occupation for minorities in the Air Force, it only 
fluctuated around the 24 percent level.  Similarly, health grew 
only modestly to about 20 percent, while administration and 
supply fell back from 32 percent to about 24. percent.  Some of 
this slack was picked up by engineer/maintenance, which increased 
to over 20 percent during the drawdown (making the Air Force, 
proportionally, the largest employer of minorities in this 
occupation in DoD). 
Table 22.  Percent Distribution of Minority Commissioned Officers 
by Department of Defense Occupation, 1987-1994 
Air Force 
DOD 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Occupation 
General 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Tactical 24.2 24.9 25.0 25.2 25.9 25.4 24.8 24.0 
Intelligence 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.3 
Eng & Maint 16.7 21.4 21.2 20.4 20.4 20.3 19.4 20.1 
Sei & Prof 5.0 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.9 5.8 
Health 15.5 15.9 16.5 17.8 17.7 18.4 19.7 19.8 
Admin 23.6 15.4 14.6 13.9 13.7 13.5 12.5 12.7 
Supply 8.6 11.2 11.2 11.1 11.0 11.2 11.5 11.6 
Non-occ 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.6 2.1 1.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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E.   SUMMARY 
It can be seen that the OMF provides some useful snapshots 
of the representation of officers across DoD throughout the 
drawdown.  The restrictions that have been placed upon the OMF do 
not limit its usefulness for this research but rather improve the 
reliability of the data.  The tabulations in this chapter serve 
to highlight the differences in both the size and extent of the 
drawdown between the four services and also among the various 
racial/ethnic groups.  Furthermore, key occupational trends of 
the minority officers throughout the drawdown have been noted. 
This is important background information for the model 
specification process that is undertaken in Chapter V. 
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V.  METHODOLOGY IN PROMOTION ANALYSIS 
A.   DESCRIPTION OF DATA: OFFICER COHORT FILES 
Officer cohort files were created for the years 1977, 1980, 
1983, and 1987.  The project assembles data on promotion rates by 
service and by promotion point (0-3, 0-4).  These rates are 
analyzed to determine whether statistically significant 
differences exist between racial and ethnic groups, and to 
determine whether such differences have changed over time (that 
is, whether racial/ethnic differences are widening or narrowing 
throughout the drawdown). 
These cohort files are essentially put into pairs for the 
purposes of this analysis.  The 1977 and 1980 cohorts are used to 
assess 0-4 promotion, while the 1983 and 1987 cohorts are used to 
examine 0-3 promotion.  In each pair, the former cohort is in 
zone for promotion prior to the drawdown, while the latter cohort 
reaches the promotion zone during the drawdown.  In this way, the 
effect of the drawdown on the promotion to each rank can be 
estimated. 
The study concentrates primarily on the 0-4 outcomes, as 
this is clearly the most important obstacle for any officer in 
pursuing a 20-year career in the military.  Promotion to 0-5 is 
beyond the scope of this study, because so few officers from the 
1980 cohort had been promoted by 1994 (less than one percent). 
This severe truncation problem renders any comparison with the 
1977 cohort meaningless.  Furthermore, the promotees in both 
cohorts have been promoted during the drawdown.  A cohort from 
about 1973 (which would have come into zone for promotion prior 
to the drawdown) would have been required for the purpose of 
analyzing promotion to 0-5. 
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B.   LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA SET 
1.   Data Requirements 
The limitations of the data set can only be determined 
when the requirements of the data for this analysis are 
considered.  It is therefore appropriate to examine the 
theoretical promotion models.  The two variables that are at play 
with respect to promotion behavior are how quickly promotion 
occurs (time) and how likely promotion is (probability). 
This promotion behavior is governed by a vector of 
individual characteristics (X), a vector of occupational group 
indicator variables for each individual 'i' (Z), and promotion 
information (W).  It is assumed that these variables affect both 
time to promotion and the probability—though these effects will 
not always be the same.  For example, some occupational 
variables may have a greater impact on promotion time than on the 
likelihood of promotion.  Conversely, educational variables may 
have a greater impact on promotion probability.  None of these 
variables, however, should be mutually exclusive between the two 
models. 
Promotion success can therefore be simply represented 
as: 
Yi = B0 + BXX + B2Z + B3W + e± 
where 'e' is an unobserved error term.  This theoretical model 
provides a useful guideline for the selection and creation of 
more detailed variables to specify the promotion models. 
Ideally, the individual characteristics (X) should include the 
following: 
a. gender; 
b. ethnic/racial group; 
c. education level; 
d. undergraduate GPA and an indicator of college guality; 
e. commissioning source; 
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f. indicators of performance prior to the promotion point 
(e.g., scores from fitness reports or FITREPs); 
g. indicators of stability (e.g., marital status); 
h.   age at time of commissioning; 
i.   whether or not the officer has prior enlisted service; 
j.   measures of motivation and aptitude. 
Occupational group indicator variables (Z) only reguire 
information on the occupation in which the officer is employed at 
the time he/she is in zone for promotion.  Promotion information 
(W) that is relevant to promotion outcomes includes: 
a. whether an officer has already failed to be promoted 
once ; 
b. number of recommendations for early promotion on 
his/her fitness reports; 
c. number of medals awarded; and 
d. completion of essential milestone gualifications or 
courses. 
If all of these variables could be incorporated into 
the promotion models, most of the identifiable factors affecting 
promotion would be identified.  This would minimize any indirect 
effects that might be reflected in the ethnic variables' 
coefficients, so that these coefficients actually portray the 
true direct effect of minority status on promotion outcomes. 
2.   Data Limitations 
Unfortunately, the DMDC officer cohort files do not 
have all of the information listed above.  Although only two of 
the nine individual characteristics variables are unavailable, 
they are probably the most important two of that group.  The 
omission of undergraduate GPA and an indicator of college guality 
(which reflect education guality) represents a potential 
misspecification of the model.  The absence of this information 
in the model is likely to overstate the importance of the ethnic 
variables because of possible differences in the guality of 
colleges attended by minorities and non-minorities and the GPAs 
of population subgroups (Armour-Lightner, 1985).  This may reduce 
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the confidence that can be placed on the results of the models 
and must be taken into account when appraising estimated 
coefficients. 
Similarly, the absence of any indicators of motivation, 
aptitude, and performance (namely, information from performance 
evaluations) is a concern.  These factors are important 
determinants of promotion success, regardless of the ethnicity or 
race of the officers.  This is a less serious problem, because a 
proxy variable designed to capture some of these effects can be 
created.  This variable is called STUDY.  A description of this 
variable and the rationale behind it is presented below. 
The data set also places a limitation upon the 
occupational group indicator variables (Z).  The most accurate 
form of this occupational information would be to have the 
occupation of each officer for the year in which he or she is 
first considered for promotion.  The problem with this, however, 
is that in any given year within the data set, about 20 to 30 
percent of the officers have an unknown occupation.  To avoid 
losing such a large proportion of the sample, a different 
occupation variable was created.  This variable looked for an 
occupation code at each year of an officer's career from the time 
of commissioning until an occupation code was found.  Although 
this variable does not capture any changes in career stream, it 
did reduce the number of observations with unknown occupation to 
only 108.  These records were deleted from the sample. 
Finally, the officer cohort files do not have any of 
the promotion information variables (W).  Again, these variables 
are a reflection of the motivation, aptitude, and performance of 
the officers.  Although it is assumed that part of this influence 
will be captured in the STUDY variable, the potential 
limitations of this variable in satisfactorily reflecting these 
attributes must be recognized in the interpretation of the 
promotion models. 
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C.   DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIVARIATE PROMOTION MODELS 
1.   Restrictions and Assumptions 
A number of restrictions have been placed upon the 
officer cohort files: 
a. The paygrade in the officers' entry year must be 0-1. 
This restriction eliminates warrant officers and 
officers of other ranks from the cohort (particularly 
professionals, such as doctors and lawyers who may be 
fast-tracked to 0-4).  It therefore provides a more 
homogeneous group of officers who can justifiably be 
compared on their merits for promotion. 
b. The month and year of entry variables must produce an 
entry date that falls within the fiscal year of that 
cohort.  This restriction ensures that all observations 
are valid members of a cohort group.  (Some entry dates 
went as far back as the 1950s.) 
c. Officers with an occupation code of zero, one, or nine 
were restricted from the sample.  (These are unknown, 
general, and non-occupational, respectively.) 
Occupation codes of unknown and non-occupational do not 
provide any worthwhile information about the officers 
concerned.  At the same time, for this sample, an 
occupation code of general (or flag officer) must be a 
mistake.  The remaining sample is distributed among 
seven clearly defined occupations. 
These restrictions considerably reduced the number of 
observations, as reflected in Table 22.  However, the restricted 
sample is still of sufficient size to support the statistical 
modeling and to provide representative samples for all 
demographic groups. 
The main assumption that is made in the models concerns 
promotion zones.  Promotion zones are important because it is at 
this time that officers can confirm whether or not they will be 
able to get promoted and continue to serve in the military. 
Furthermore, promotion rates are generally calculated as the 
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Table 22.  Number of Officers in Officer Cohort Files (1977, 
1980, 1983, 1987) Before and After Restrictions 
Cohort A. Total Number B. Restricted Number Difference 
Year of Officers of Officers (A minus B) 
1977 25,335 14,909 10,426 
1980 29,434 18,848 10,586 
1983 29,264 20,034 9,230 
1987 22,646 12,877 9,769 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
percentage of officers in zone that are promoted.  For a DoD-wide 
study, this is complicated by the fact that the separate services 
have different minimum time-in-rank periods, causing promotion 
zones to fall at different times.  None of the services 
customarily consider an 0-3 for promotion to 0-4 within the 
individual's first four years of time-in-grade.  Therefore, it is 
assumed that any officer who leaves the military within this 
period has not done so because of failure to be selected for 
promotion.  Officers who resign after this time are assumed to 
have done so because they have either failed to be promoted or 
they realize that they are unlikely to be promoted in the future. 
It is against this pool of officers who serve beyond four years 
as an 0-3 that the promotion rates to 0-4 are calculated. 
2.   Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in the promotion models are 
TIME4 and PR0M4.  TIME4 is a continuous variable reflecting the 
number of months of commissioned service to 0-4 promotion.  This 
is the dependent variable for the OLS regression models.  PR0M4 
is a dummy variable, coded with a value of one for officers who 
are promoted to 0-4 (zero for those who do not) within the 
arbitrary time period adopted for all 0-3 officers who serve at 
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least four years in grade.  This is the dependent variable for 
the logistic models.  The same methodology is applied to the 
creation of dependent variables for the 0-3 promotion models 
(TIME3 and PROM3, respectively). 
3.   Explanatory Variables 
a.   Dummy Variables 
All but one of the explanatory variables in the 
promotion models are dummy variables.  A description of these 
variables is presented below: 
i. FEMALE — This variable is designed to capture the 
effect of gender on promotability. The reference group 
is the male officer population. 
ii.  ETHNIC — This variable seeks to identify the 
effect of ethnicity on promotion outcomes.  Blacks, 
Hispanics, and others (Asians,American Indians, and 
Pacific Islanders) are targeted against the reference 
group of white officers. 
iii. POSTGRAD — Officers who entered the 
military with a postgraduate degree are compared with 
all other officers in their cohort.  Hence, the 
importance of having advanced education before 
commissioning can be assessed. 
iv.  STUDY — The impact of completing a postgraduate 
degree while on active duty is isolated by this 
variable.  Perhaps more importantly, though, is the 
assumption that this variable serves as a proxy for an 
individual's motivation, aptitude, and performance that 
cannot be observed directly due to the absence of 
information from officer performance appraisals.  This 
variable identifies all officers who are selected for 
funded graduate education by the services.  These 
officers are generally selected because they are high 
performers.  It also identifies officers who take on 
the study commitments themselves, which, without 
discounting the possibility that they are high 
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performers, is a display of motivation to one's career 
and personal productivity. 
v.   ACADEMY — A commissioning source variable that 
compares the promotability of graduates of the service 
academies to those of Officer Candidate School (OCS). 
vi-  ROTC — A commissioning source variable that 
compares the promotability of graduates of ROTC 
programs to those of OCS programs. 
vii. MARRIED/CHILDREN — These variables are designed 
to be indicators of personal stability.  Across a large 
group of people, it is hypothesized that officers who 
are married and/or have children are generally more 
stable and career-minded.  The reference populations 
are simply those officers who are not married and those 
without children, respectively. 
viii. PRIORSVC — Officers with prior enlisted service 
are differentiated by this variable to assess the 
impact of enlisted experience on promotability as an 
officer. 
ix.   OCCUPATION — Six of the seven occupation groups 
(tactical operations, intelligence, engineer/ 
maintenance, science and professional, health, and 
supply) were included in the promotion models. 
Administration was excluded as the reference group. 
These variables highlight the potential importance of 
the different occupations on promotion outcomes. 
x.   SERVICES — Dummy variables for the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Air Force were specified for the 
unrestricted models.  The sample of ethnic officers 
(particularly Hispanics and others) are too small to 
run promotion models by racial/ethnic group for each 
service.  Only a general DoD model can be restricted 
by racial/ethnic group.  Because there are distinct 
differences in the promotion behavior of the services, 
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these variables are required to hold that behavior 
constant. 
b.   Continuous Variable 
The only continuous variable in the promotion 
models is AGE.  This variable records the age of an officer at 
the time of commissioning in an entry year.  Although people can 
benefit from added experience and maturity, the military is a 
fairly youthful organization.  It is hypothesized that being 
considerably older than the average age of officers in one's 
peergroup may influence the probability of promotion. 
4.   A Priori Expectations 
The models, therefore, assess the effect of minority 
status on promotion while holding constant the following factors: 
gender, education, performance/aptitude (STUDY), commissioning 
source, marital and parental status, prior service, age at entry 
year, occupation, and service.  The null hypothesis is that 
minority status will not, in itself, have a significant direct 
effect across the models.  This is because poor promotion 
performance is normally attributed to factors such as lower 
education levels and being in an occupation or service with a 
"tight" promotion structure.  These factors are accounted for in 
the promotion models. 
E.   STATISTICAL PROCEDURES: OLS AND LOGIT 
The OLS regression models assess the importance of the 
determinants of the time to promotion as 0-3 and 0-4.  The 
coefficients of the significant variables indicate the change in 
time (in months) associated with each variable, holding all other 
factors constant.  At first glance, this may seem to be of 
incidental importance, since promotion times can vary so much 
according to occupation and service.  However, these variables 
are also held constant in the models.  It is not a great concern 
if minorities have been getting promoted a month or two slower 
than non-minorities.  If the lag is about six months or more, 
however, it might reveal that more minority officers are not 
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being selected on their first look before the promotion boards. 
In this case, the OLS coefficients may yield some insight as to 
how to resolve promotion discrepancies. 
The logit models examine the determinants of the probability 
of promotion.  In this case, the coefficients of the significant 
variables are converted into the percentage change in the 
probability of promotion.  This is done by multiplying the 
coefficient by the overall sample promotion rate and then 
multiplying the product by the reciprocal of the promotion rate. 
The effect of each explanatory variable on promotion can then be 
compared. 
The statistical significance of the OLS and logit 
coefficients are assessed at the 0.05 level of significance. 
This removes the temptation to adjust the level of significance 
to suit the output and interpretations of the models. 
Furthermore, Chow tests and log likelihood ratio tests are 
conducted on the OLS and logistic models, respectively.  These 
tests help to establish if the determinants and outcomes of the 
promotion process are significantly different over time or 
between sub-groups (that is, whether or not their difference can 
be purely attributed to statistical error).  Specifically, they 
attempt to see if the relationship between the explanatory and 
dependent variables are stable over time, or across sub-samples. 
If they are not, then one eguation or model cannot be used to 
explain the relationship over the whole time period (before and 
during the drawdown) or sample (across the various ethnic groups 
and services).  This information provides insight into the impact 
that the drawdown has had on the promotion outcomes.  It also 
illustrates how different the determinants of promotion are 
between the officers of different racial/ethnic groups and 
services. 
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VI.  ANALYSIS OF PROMOTION OUTCOMES 
A.  PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1.   Promotion Times 
It is appropriate, at this point, to look at the 
promotion rates throughout the drawdown that are generated by the 
promotion variables described in Chapter V.  This clarifies the 
extent of any unadjusted disparities in promotion outcomes.  The 
statistical modeling process then tries to explain the 
disparities and identify any changes in the determinants of 
promotion. 
Table 23 presents the average promotion times in months 
to 0-3 and 0-4 for the major racial/ethnic groups (a table of 
promotion times by service is pointless because different time- 
in-grade policies ensure diverse outcomes that are unrelated to 
individual performance).  The percentages in bold with an 
asterisk are unegual (compared with the remainder of the cohort) 
at a 0.05 level of significance in a T-test of means. 
It can be seen that although Hispanics had 
significantly slower promotion time to 0-3 in the pre-drawdown 
cohort (1983), the three-month differential is not of any 
practical significance.  The promotion rates of the ethnic groups 
to 0-3 during the drawdown (1987 cohort), however, are egual in 
both statistical and practical terms.  Unless there are large 
differences in the characteristics of these groups (such as 
education levels or performance), this has become a more 
equitable outcome during the drawdown. 
As would be expected, there is a lot more variation in 
the promotion times to 0-4.  However, the statistical 
significance of the variation is largely maintained into the 
drawdown, with all promotion times slowing.  Whites are still 
promoted significantly faster, while blacks and others are 
promoted significantly slower.  Blacks are promoted to 0-4, on 
average, about five months slower than are whites.  This may be 
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partly associated with their relatively high representation in 
the Army, which is one of the slower promoting services. 
Otherwise, this is a concern since it indicates that a much 
higher proportion of black officers are failing to select for 
promotion during their first chance. 
Table 23.  Mean Time (in Months) to Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group and Entry Cohort 
Time to Promotion: 0-3 













Time to Promotion: 0-4 













* The percentages with an asterisk are unequal to the remainder 
of the cohort group at 0.05 level of significance in a T-test. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
2.  Promotion Rates 
Table 24 displays the promotion rates by racial/ethnic 
group for those officers who survived to the 0-3 or 0-4 point. 
Again, the percentages in bold are those that differ from the 
remainder of the sample at the 0.05 level of significance.  The 
most conspicuous finding is with respect to black officers:  they 
are the only group that has been promoted to 0-3 at a 
statistically significantly lower rate than the other racial/ 
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ethnic groups throughout the period of observation.  However, 
there has been a significant improvement in the promotion rates 
of black officers to 0-4 during the drawdown.  The deterioration 
of the promotion rates of the other groups is also a concern, as 
they appear to be the only group that has been adversely 
affected, in relative terms, in promoting to 0-4 during the 
drawdown. 
Table 24.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group and Entry Cohort 
Rate of Promotion: 0-3 













Rate of Promotion: 0-4 













* The percentages with an asterisk are unequal to the remainder 
of the cohort group at 0.05 level of significance in a T-test. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
Promotion rates by service are shown in Table 25.  With 
the exception of Army, the 0-3 promotion rates have been largely 
unaffected by the drawdown.  A diversity in promotion rates still 
exists.  At the 0-4 level, however, the Navy's promotion rates 
resisted some of the downward pressure of the drawdown, and 
appear considerably higher than those of the other services 
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(which are grouped closely together).  The Air Force's promotion 
rates dropped sharply from about 77 percent to 67 percent.  The 
Marine Corps' 0-3 and 0-4 promotion rates have remained 
relatively stable throughout the drawdown.  (These findings 
confirm the need to account for an officer's service in the 
promotion models.) 
Table 25.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Service and Entry Cohort 
Rate of Promotion: 0-3 
















Rate of Promotion: 0-4 
















Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
There are also differences in promotion rates to 0-4 
between the DoD occupations.  These rates are presented in Table 
26.  Table 13 in Chapter IV shows that the highest representation 
of minorities across DoD is in administration and supply.  These 
occupations have the lowest 0-4 promotion rates for the cohorts 
who were in-zone prior to and during the drawdown period.  The 
remaining occupations had very similar promotion rates in the 
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1977 cohort.  The health field defied the trend of the other 
occupations by actually having its promotion rate rise for those 
evaluated during the drawdown.  The remaining occupations 
experienced reductions of similar proportions.  Given that the 
representation of minority officers in health has risen 
throughout the drawdown to over 15 percent of all health 
officers, one can argue that minority officer promotion has 
generally not been hampered by occupational trends. 
Table 26.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-4, by DoD 
Occupation, 1977 and 1980 Cohorts 






Eng & Maint 





















Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
Having seen differences in the promotion rates across 
DoD between the racial groups and the services, it is appropriate 
to consider the differences by race in each of the services.  It 
can be determined whether minority promotion rates in each 
service are proportionately affected by the difference in the 
rates of each service.  In some cases, particularly in the Marine 
Corps, the numbers of Hispanic and other officers are too small 
to support promotion models restricted by service and race. 
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Similarly, in Tables 27 through 30, some of the rates are 
abnormal (high or low) because of small sample sizes. 
Consequently, an additional column has been added called 
"Ethnic".  This is the average promotion rate of the three 
minority groups.  While not being as sensitive to the racial 
differences, this column is less vulnerable to sample size 
problems and, therefore, provides more reliable percentages. 
Table 27 presents promotion rates by racial/ethnic 
group for the Army.  As seen here, blacks were promoted to 0-3 at 
a much lower rate than all other ethnic groups.  Hispanics and 
others, however, are the most successful — even more so than 
whites.  Consequently, the ethnic and non-ethnic (white) rates 
are comparable. 
Table 27.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group and Entry Cohort 
Army: 0-3 




























* "Ethnic" is the average promotion rate for all minority 
officers. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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Ethnics have not been as successful as whites at the 
0-4 level.  Moreover, the ethnic groups have been affected 
differently through the drawdown years.  Promotion rates have 
improved for Hispanics, remained fairly constant for blacks, and 
fallen for others.  Most importantly, blacks and Hispanics have 
generally been just as likely to be promoted to 0-4 in the Army 
during the drawdown (as compared with DoD as a whole), even 
though the Army promotes at a lower rate than the other services. 
The gap between the promotion rates of ethnics and whites has 
narrowed markedly in the drawdown. 
Navy promotion rates by racial/ethnic group are shown 
in Table 28.  Promotion rates for 0-3 are generally unchanged 
through the drawdown.  White officers have been promoted at about 
3.4 percentage points higher rate than that of ethnic officers 
Table 28.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group and Entry Cohort 
Navy: 0-3 




























* "Ethnic" is the average promotion rate for all minority 
officers. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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(86.4 percent versus 83.0 percent, respectively)—much higher 
than the DoD average differential of 1.9 percent.  Even though 
Navy has the highest promotion rates of all services by a 
considerable margin, the promotion of black Naval officers to 0-4 
is similar to the rates experienced by blacks in the Army. 
Therefore, black Naval officers are being promoted poorly, in 
relative terms.  Hispanic 0-4 promotion rates have tumbled in the 
drawdown while the promotion of the others has risen above the 
level of white officers.  The Navy has the largest diaparity in 
promotion rates between whites and minorities at the 0-4 level 
during the drawdown. 
Marine Corps promotion rates by race (see Table 29) 
reflect some of the trends displayed in the Navy.  In this case, 
though, the small sample size of the Hispanics and others 
Table 29.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group and Entry Cohort 
Marine Corps: 0-3 













Marine Corps: 0-4 













* "Ethnic" is the average promotion rate for all minority 
officers. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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necessitates making the comparisons between the whites and 
ethnics.  The promotion rates to 0-3 and 0-4 for whites fell 
marginally during the drawdown.  This is in contrast to the 
promotion rates for ethnic officers, which rose considerably 
during the period.  As in the Navy, ethnic officers are still 
less successful in promoting to 0-3; however, they are more 
successful in promoting to 0-4 in the Marine Corps in the 
drawdown. 
This is also the promotion experience of minority 
officers in the Air Force (Table 30).  Promotion rates for 
minorities rose during the drawdown at the 0-3 and 0-4 levels, 
yet were one percentage point higher and one percentage point 
lower, respectively, than the promotion rates of white officers 
during the drawdown.  The promotion rates of the three minority 
Table 30.  Average Rate (Percent) of Promotion to 0-3 and 0-4, 
by Racial/Ethnic Group and Entry Cohort 
Air Force: 0-3 













Air Force: 0-4 













* "Ethnic" is the average promotion rate for all minority 
officers. 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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groups to 0-3 all improved during the drawdown, but this was not 
the case for Hispanics and others with respect to 0-4 promotion. 
However, this trend did not adversely affect these groups 
relative to the white officers.  Promotion rates to 0-4 by race 
became more uniform in this period. 
When assessing the impact of the drawdown on the 
promotion of minority officers, there is one major conclusion 
that is evident across all of the services:  the promotion rates 
of minority officers to 0-4 improved relative to the promotion 
rates of white officers (even in the Army and Navy, where 
minority officers still have lower promotion rates than their 
white counterparts).  Irrespective of whether the data in the 
next section suggest that there is any bias against minority 
officers in the promotion process, this conclusion still holds, 
and it suggests that the drawdown process is not associated with 
any adverse impact on minority promotion as a whole. 
B.   PROMOTION TIME MODEL OUTCOMES (OLS) 
The OLS promotion time tables that follow (Tables 31 through 
35) present only the coefficients of the significant variables 
(at the 0.05 level of significance).  The full OLS results for 
the DoD models are presented in Appendices A and B.  The 
coefficients of the variable AGE can be interpreted as the 
additional months to promotion that are associated with each 
additional year of age at entry, holding all other variables 
constant.  Similarly, the coefficients of the dummy variables 
reflect the change in promotion time that is associated with 
being in a given status (e.g. being married), holding the others 
constant. 
1.   0-3 Promotion Time 
The data in column 1 of Table 31 support the a priori 
expectations.  Prior to the drawdown (the 1983 cohort), race was 
not a significant factor across DoD and was only associated with 
small deviations in promotion time in the Navy and Army.  The 
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significance was service in the Marine Corps, with a nine to ten 
month slower promotion time to 0-3.  This is not a concern, 
however, because it is systematic of being a Marine, and it 
affects the entire peer group.  Minority officers with 
postgraduate education at the entry year benefited 
more from this education in terms of promotion speed than did 
white officers. 
The 0-3 promotion data during the drawdown (1987 
cohort) are displayed in Table 32.  Although- minor in scale, the 
two most important changes from results shown for the earlier 
cohort (Table 31) are that equally qualified and experienced 
female officers are no longer being promoted slower than men 
(FEMALE in the DoD model is now insignificant), while similarly 
credentialled minority officers are now being promoted faster 
than their white officers (ETHNIC in the DoD model now has a 
significantly faster promotion time).  The relative value of 
POSTGRAD has improved for minority officers, although it has 
fallen in absolute terms.  The Army has become a relatively much 
slower promoter during the drawdown than have the other services, 
as evidenced by the changing sign of the coefficients for the 
services (the Army is the reference group and the negative values 
for the other services indicate that they are all promoting their 
officers relatively faster). 
The Chow test (Gujarati, 1988) results are presented in 
Table 33.  All of the tests for the 1983 and 1987 0-3 cohorts 
reject the null hypothesis (H0) that the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables in the promotion time models for the 
respective sub-samples are equivalent.  It can be argued that 
during the drawdown, the determinants of 0-3 promotion changed 
significantly for all racial/ethnic groups and for each service 
(lines 1-20).  Similarly, a statistically significant difference 
was maintained in each 0-3 cohort between white and minority 
officers (lines 23 and 24).  This reinforces the significance of 
the improvement in 0-3 promotion time that was experienced by 
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Table 33.  Chow Test Outocmes for OLS Promotion Models, 
0.05 Level of Significnace 
Sub-samples tested Accept H0        Reject H0 
1. DoD: 1977 & 1980 x 
2. DoD: 1983 & 1987 x 
3. Ethnic: 1977 & 1980 x 
4. Ethnic: 1983 & 1987 x 
5. White: 1977 & 1980 x 
6. White: 1983 & 1987 x 
7. Black: 1977 & 1980 x 
8. Black: 1983 & 1987 x 
9.   Hispanic: 1977 & 1980 
10. Hispanic: 1983 & 1987 
11. Other: 1977 & 1980 




12. Other: 1983 & 1987 x 
13. Navy: 1977 & 1980 x 
14. Navy: 1983 & 1987 
15. Army: 1977 & 1980 
16. Army: 1983 & 1987 
17. Marines: 1977 & 1980 X 
18. Marines: 1983 & 1987 x 
19. Air Force: 1977 & 1980 x 
20. Air Force: 1983 & 1987 x 
21. White/ethnic: 1977 x 
22. White/ethnic: 1980 X 
23. White/ethnic: 1983 x 
24. White/ethnic: 1987 x 
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2.   0-4 Promotion Time 
The trends in the determinants of 0-4 promotion time 
are  similar to those revealed for the paygrade of 0-3.  The 
model results for the pre-drawdown (1977) cohort are shown in 
Table 34.  Although minority status for the 1977 cohort was 
associated with faster promotion in the Marine Corps, this was 
not a significant factor across DoD.  The importance of POSTGRAD 
on promotion time was limited to the others component of minority 
officers (nine months faster).  The health occupation was 
associated with particularly fast promotion to 0-4 for minority 
officers.  Service differences were also significant. 
The determinants of 0-4 promotion during the drawdown 
for the 1980 cohort are displayed in Table 35.  The slower 
promotion time that was associated with female status before the 
drawdown (see Table 34) is no longer evident.  On the other hand, 
minority status is now associated with slower promotion in the 
Army and the Air Force, making it a significant variable for the 
DoD model.  The Navy is now the only service with significantly 
faster promotion than the reference group (Army). 
Referring back to Table 33, it can be seen that the 
Chow test outcomes tell a slightly different story.  Serials 21 
and 22 suggest, for whites and minorities, that although their 
relationship between promotion time to 0-4 and their respective 
explanatory variables were statistically different for the 1977 
cohort (pre-drawdown), this is no longer the case in the 
drawdown.  Even though the promotion determinants for each racial 
group (and for all services other than the Marine Corps), have 
changed during the period of the drawdown (see serials 1-20), the 
drawdown has been associated with a smoothing out in the 
differences between the promotion behavior of white and minority 
officers.  When consideration is also made of the fact that the 
promotion time to 0-3 has become relatively more favorable for 
minority officers during the drawdown, it can be argued that the 
impact of the drawdown on promotion times of minorities,in 
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differences in promotion times that were apparent in the models, 
the more important outcomes on the success of military careers 
are the promotion rates. 
C.   PROMOTION LIKELIHOOD MODEL OUTCOMES (LOGIT) 
1.   0-3 Promotion Likelihood 
Table 36 shows the determinants of promotion for the 
0-3 promotion rate models for the 1983 cohort (the full results 
for the DoD logit model are presented in Appendix C).  The most 
notable factors are: 
a. women of other racial groups and those in the Navy 
are more likely to be promoted than are men; 
b. the effect of minority status is not significant across 
DoD, yet it is associated with an increased promotion 
probability in the Army and a lower promotion 
probability in the Navy and Marine Corps (particularly 
for Hispanic officers); 
c. service academy graduates tend to be promoted at a much 
higher rate than officers from other commissioning 
sources; and 
d. most of the occupations are associated with increased 
promotion probability over the reference occupation 
(administration). 
The 1987 cohort models (Table 37) show that the effect 
of gender on the likelihood of promotion to 0-3 in the drawdown 
years has disappeared altogether.  Once again, minority status is 
not associated with changes in the probability of promotion at 
the DoD level, but it is significant for the Marine Corps and Air 
Force.  The significance of the occupational variables and of 
graduating from an academy are considerably reduced.  The 
variable STUDY (proxy for a performance indicator) has become the 
single most important explanatory variable.  For white officers 
in the Army and the Air Force, this variable increases the 
likelihood of promotion by over 30 percent.  MARRIED and CHILDREN 
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(stability measures) have also become significant across the 1987 
cohort models.  It appears that inthe more competitive promotion 
environment of the drawdown, promotion boards may be placing a 
relatively high value on personal or career stability.  This is 
not to say that promotion boards specifically look to see if an 
officer is married or has children.  Rather, over large groups of 
people, these traits tend to be associated with a greater degree 
of career commitment and stability.  Gender, ethnic status, 
commissioning source, and occupation are less important because 
the drawdown is affecting all of these groups in a fairly even- 
handed manner. 
The log likelihood ratio tests (Gujarati, 1988) are 
presented in Table 38.  The logistic models required for these 
tests could not converge for the minority group restricted 
models.  However, the log likelihood ratio tests for DoD and each 
of the services (1983 and 1987) reject the null hypothesis (H0) 
that their relationships before and during the drawdown are 
equal.  This confirms the finding that the variables affecting 
promotion outcomes have changed fundamentally during the 
drawdown. 
2.  0-4 Promotion Likelihood 
The significant variables influencing the probability 
of promotion to 0-4 in the 1977 cohort are shown in Table 39 (the 
full model results for all of the 0-4 promotion probability 
models are shown in Appendices D through M).  Being female was 
associated with an increased likelihood of promotion for whites 
in the Navy and the Army (but not for minorities).  Minority 
status was associated with large reductions in the probability of 
promotion in the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force.  The 
performance and stability proxies were the most important 
remaining variables (like the trends of the 0-3 promotion models 
during the drawdown), reflecting the fact that even before the 
drawdown, promotion to 0-4 was a competitive process. 
The impact of the drawdown period on 0-4 promotions can 
be assessed in Table 40.  The positive influence of gender on 
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Table 38.  Log Likelihood Ratio Test Outcomes for Logit 
Promotion Models, 0.05 Level of Significance 
Sub-samples tested 
1. DoD: 1977 & 1980 
2. DoD: 1983 & 1987 
3. White: 1977 & 1980 
4. Ethnic: 1977 & 1980 
5. Black: 1977 & 1980 
6. Hispanic: 1977 & 1980 
7. Other: 1977 & 1980 
8. Navy: 1977 & 1980 
9. Navy: 1983 & 1987 
10. Army: 1977 & 1980 
11. Army: 1983 & 1987 
12. Marines: 1977 & 1980 
13. Marines: 1983 & 1987 
14. Air Force: 1977 & 1980 

















Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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promotion for women across DoD has increased during the period of 
the drawdown—due mainly to a large increase in the effect of 
this variable in the Air Force.  Conversely, the significance of 
minority status on promotion outcomes has dissipated in all the 
services except for Navy.  Holding all other variables constant, 
minority status in the Navy is associated with a 7.6 percent 
reduction in the likelihood of promotion.  This problem is 
discussed further in Section D below. 
STUDY and MARRIED are still very significant 
determinants of promotion probability, yet PRIORSVC and AGE have 
also become significant across racial groups and services.  This 
is further evidence of the scrutiny with which promotion boards 
must operate during a downsizing environment.  Officers who are 
older and/or have prior service appear less likely to be promoted 
than younger officers who have generally gone straight from 
college into one of the officer training programs. 
The log likelihood ratio tests (Table 38) indicate 
that, although there is a significant difference in the 1977 and 
1980 models for the Navy, Army, Air Force and whites, there has 
been no significant change in the models for the Marine Corps and 
all of the minority groups.  This implies that the adverse impact 
on 0-4 promotion outcomes that has been associated with the 
drawdown is only applicable to the former group (i.e. the Navy, 
Army, Air Force, and whites).  The promotability of minorities 
has not been significantly affected at the DoD level.  It is only 
in the Navy that minorities have encountered lower promotion 
rates that cannot be explained by the model. 
D.  MINORITY 0-4 PROMOTION IN THE NAVY 
As mentioned earlier, the Navy 0-4 promotion probability 
model indicates that, holding all other variables constant, 
minority status is associated with a reduction in promotion 
probability of about 7.6 percent.  An examination of the service 
variable for Navy, across the different racial/ethnic restricted 
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models in Table 40, provides more insight into the nature of this 
problem. 
It appears incongruous, at first, that the change in 
promotion probability for minorities in the Navy is -7.6 percent, 
while the corresponding value for serving in the Navy in the 
ethnic model is +11.1 percent.  This is the result of having 
different reference groups for each variable coefficient.  The - 
7.6 percent coefficient is comparing the likelihood of promotion 
of a minority officer in the Navy against the likelihood of 
promotion of a non-minority officer in the Navy.  By contrast, 
the 11.1 percent coefficient is comparing the likelihood of 
promotion of a minority officer in the Navy against the 
likelihood of promotion of a minority officer in the Army.  This 
is less than the net benefit that white officers receive from 
being in the service that promotes at the highest rate (see Table 
25) of 18.8 percent.  Therefore, minority officers are relatively 
worse off in the Navy than white officers in that they gain less 
from the Navy's overall higher promotion rates. 
Looking more closely at the minority models, though, it can 
be seen that all of the benefit of faster promotion to 0-4 for 
minority officers in the Navy is, in effect, being siphoned 
through the "other" ethnic group.  These officers are 37.0 
percent more likely to be promoted by serving in the Navy as 
opposed to the Army.  Meanwhile, blacks and Hispanics are the 
only racial/ethnic groups that receive no statistically 
significant improvement in promotion rates in the Navy, compared 
with those who serve in the Army (given their endowments of 
education and other characteristics).  This is defying the fact 
that, during the drawdown, the Army 0-4 promotion rate of 64.9 
percent is much lower than the Navy's rate of 76.7 percent (Table 
25) . 
It could be argued that the failure to detect faster 
promotion for blacks and Hispanics in the Navy (compared with the 
Army) is due to model specification problems—namely, that, 
although postgraduate education is included in the models, GPA 
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and an indicator of undergraduate college quality are not.  This 
can be particularly relevant when we are dealing with different 
population groups.  However, if model specification problems of 
this nature are the cause, then they should also be apparent in 
one or more of the other services.  After all, the Navy is 
neither the largest nor the smallest employer of minority 
officers (in either absolute or relative terms), and it has 
neither the lowest nor highest technical requirements for its 
officers, when compared with the Army, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps.  Clearly, the promotion of black and Hispanic officers to 
0-4 in the Navy requires further examination. 
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
This study presents information and analysis pertaining to 
the impact of the drawdown on the promotion of minority officers. 
There are essentially two levels to the data analysis.  First, 
there is an examination of unadjusted representation, occupation, 
and promotion trends.  Second, the effect of-minority status on 
promotion outcomes is assessed in a multivariate model that 
controls for other factors that may influence the promotion 
process. 
A number of conclusions arise from the analysis of the 
unadjusted trends.  The drawdown in the officer strength of DoD 
has not been implemented evenly across the separate services or 
the ethnic/racial groups.  The data show that, throughout the 
drawdown, the proportion of white officers has fallen, while the 
proportions of minority groups have risen (due mainly to 
increases in minority representation in both relative and 
absolute terms in the Navy and Marine Corps).  Although minority 
officers are generally overrepresented in the junior ranks, 
minority representation at each paygrade has increased throughout 
the drawdown (when compared with their total officer 
representation). 
The occupational distribution of minority officers was 
stable throughout the drawdown across DoD.  Minority officers 
have tended to be overrepresented in the supply, administration, 
health, and engineer/maintenance occupations.  (Supply and 
administration had the lowest 0-4 promotion rates both before and 
during the drawdown.)  However, when the size of the occupation 
groups is considered, tactical operations becomes the singularly 
most important area—employing approximately 30 percent of 
minority officers. 
The average promotion time to 0-3 converged to 51 months for 
all racial/ethnic groups during the drawdown.  This was not 
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evident at the 0-4 level, however, where white officers continued 
to be promoted in'quicker time than the minority officers.  There 
were also differences in the promotion rates of the different 
racial/ethnic groups.  Blacks have persistently experienced lower 
promotion rates to 0-3.  Although 0-4 rates became a lot more 
uniform among whites, blacks, and Hispanics, the promotion rate 
of others appeared to deteriorate during the drawdown period. 
A number of conclusions can also be drawn from the analysis 
regarding the effect of minority status on promotion outcomes. 
Because most of the determinants of promotion can be held 
constant in the promotion models, the effect of variables such as 
minority status can be isolated.  The promotion rates of 
minorities and women to 0-3 and 0-4 have generally improved 
during the drawdown across DoD. 
The determinants of promotion probabilities across DoD have 
undergone significant change throughout the drawdown period. 
This can be attributed to the more competitive promotion 
environment that the drawdown has created.  Specifically, the 
performance and stability measures have become the most 
influential variables in determining the likelihood of promotion 
to 0-3 and 0-4.  At the 0-4 level, PRIORSVC and AGE have also 
become significant—providing further evidence of the competitive 
environment.  Commissioning source and occupation variables have 
become less important. 
At the DoD level, the drawdown period has been associated 
with an increased likelihood of promotion to 0-4 for women, as 
well as the disappearance of the reduced likelihood of promotion 
for minority officers that existed in the 1977 cohort.   The data 
suggest that minority status, per se, is no longer a factor in 
promotion outcomes; and, further, that the promotion of minority 
officers, in general, has not been adversely affected during the 
drawdown.  In the case of the Navy, the reduced likelihood of 
promotion to 0-4 associated with being a minority officer has 
decreased from 10.6 percent to 7.6 percent.  (This is still a 
modest improvement.)  However, if the different racial/ethnic 
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groups are examined, it can be argued that the 37 percent 
increase in promotion probability associated with the other 
racial/ethnic group masks a significant decline in promotion 
performance for blacks and Hispanics in the Navy. 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis represents one of the first attempts to 
determine the possible effects of the drawdown on the promotion 
of minority officers.  As such, it should only be considered a 
starting point—there are a number of issues that require further 
attention.  Although this study has reached the general 
conclusion that the promotion outcomes for minorities have 
actually benefited in relative terms during the drawdown, a 
conflicting trend was identified for black and Hispanic Naval 
officers.  Separate research should seek to explain the causes of 
this trend in the Navy. 
The present study could also be enhanced by overcoming some 
of the data limitations that existed in the DMDC data files. 
Specifically, undergraduate GPA, an indicator of college quality, 
and scores from performance evaluations should be included in any 
further research, if possible.  This would avoid the doubt 
concerning how effective the proxy variables in this study are in 
representing the missing variables. 
Any future research could also re-examine the 0-4 promotion 
outcomes farther into the drawdown, to see if the trends 
identified in this thesis are reflected in the developments of 
the later drawdown years.  It would also be useful to analyze 
officer groups that have entered the military during the 
drawdown.  A comparison of the new officers' entry 
characteristics (such as education quality and SAT scores) could 
then be made.  The effect of the drawdown on the attractiveness 
of the military as a career option (and the quality of those who 
are making the decision to join) could then be assessed.  If any 
changes of this nature are associated with particular 
racial/ethnic groups, then these would have repurcussions on 
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future promotion outcomes in DoD.  Finally, it would be 
advantageous for further research to incorporate an analysis of 
0-5 promotions.  Increasing numbers of minority officers have 
been getting promoted to 0-4.  It is appropriate to continue 
moving the focus of analysis up the promotion ladder.  This would 
help to prevent any problem areas or bottlenecks from being 
undetected for too long, so that the military's minority officer 
representation goals can be reached at all levels as 
expeditiously as possible. 
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APPENDIX A. DoD 0-3 PROMOTION TIME MODEL, 1983, 1987 
Variable 1983 1987 
Estimate T value Estimate T value 
Female 0.51 3.55 0.21 1.10 
Ethnic 0.13 0.89 -0.36 -1.96 
Postgrad -3.71 -11.34 -2.23 -4.74 
Study -0.17 -1.44 -0.98 -4.12 
Academy -1.22 -9.20 0.54 3.10 
ROTC -1.04 -10.15 -0.90 -5.78 
Married 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.19 
Children -0.16 -1.09 -0.42 -2.93 
Priorsvc 3.49 31.97 2.72 17.69 
Age 0.11 5.90 0.08 2.74 
Tactical 1.07 5.92 1.35 5.16 
Intel -0.04 -0.15 0.54 1.54 
Engmaint -0.25 -1.29 0.34 1.20 
Sciprof -3.31 -10.45 0.26 0.55 
Health -1.66 -6.72 -1.98 -5.74 
Supply 0.50 1.90 0.39 1.12 
Navy 1.27 10.24 -10.00 -49.59 
Marines 10.61 53.26 -4.07 -15.53 
Airforce 0.02 0.18 -10.45 -54.39 
F value 353.79 266.01 
R-square 0.31 0.35 
N 15185 9467 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX B. DoD 0-4 PROMOTION TIME MODEL, 1977, 1980 
Variable 1977 1980 
Estimate T value Estimate T value 
Female 1.23 3.12 -0.25 -0.83 
Ethnic 0.25 0.80 1.03 3.56 
Postgrad -3.94 -7.34 -0.22 -0.37 
Study -0.39 -1.87 0.01 0.07 
Academy -0.89 -2.69 -1.01 -3.46 
ROTC 1.23 4.53 -0.65 -2.79 
Married 0.11 0.34 0.17 0.58 
Children 0.03 0.13 -0.31 -1.34 
Priorsvc -0.90 -3.32 -1.20 -5.04 
Age 0.12 2.45 -0.00 -0.01 
Tactical -1.42 -4.39 -1.50 -4.76 
Intel -2.10 -3.85 -1.76 -3.84 
Engmaint -2.27 -6.15 -0.59 -1.75 
Sciprof -0.37 -0.52 -1.48 -2.34 
Health -5.48 -9.84 -9.18 -18.54 
Supply 0.24 0.45 0.14 0.28 
Navy -26.64 -98.10 -22.25 -83.73 
Marines 3.35 7.67 2.24 4.85 
Airforce -10.23 -42.47 -0.54 -2.21 
F value 777.98 631.45 
R-square 0.69 0.62 
N 6616 7250 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX C. DoD 0-3 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1983, 1987 





Female 0.09 1.43 0.08 0.62 
Ethnic -0.12 2.14 0.04 0.16 
Postgrad 0.18 1.19 0.47 2.13 
Study 91.00 0.00 3.07 36.24 
Academy 1.96 191.94 0.50 21.73 
ROTC -0.09 2.85 0.06 0.49 
Married 91.31 0.00 2.00 484.54 
Children 90.61 0.00 1.10 46.43 
Priorsvc -0.19 8.74 0.02 0.06 
Age -0.03 8.30 0.01 0.12 
Tactical 0.83 78.57 0.68 19.68 
Intel 0.31 5.51 0.31 2.63 
Engmaint -0.10 1.14 -0.02 0.02 
Sciprof 0.40 4.23 -0.04 0.02 
Health 0.29 4.47 -0.31 2.68 
Supply 0.11 0.83 -0.19 1.00 
Navy 0.41 35.36 1.64 252.41 
Marines -0.20 4.35 0.49 17.20 
Airforce 1.19 319.17 1.78 329.46 
Concordant 37.1% 83.3% 
N 17551 10869 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
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APPENDIX D. DoD 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 0.32 8.71 0.39 24.80 
Ethnic -0.45 31.21 -0.01 0.01 
Postgrad 0.72 20.74 1.05 46.08 
Study 1.13 273.73 1.27 530.05 
Academy 0.35 11.55 0.52 41.67 
ROTC 0.09 1.40 0.20 12.05 
Married 1.23 263.13 1.05 243.53 
Children 0.24 11.76 0.08 1.61 
Priorsvc -0.13 3.11 -0.35 32.87 
Age -0.02 1.74 -0.03 9.88 
Tactical 0.24 6.82 0.14 3.45 
Intel 0.29 3.34 0.14 1.68 
Engmaint 0.19 3.42 -0.01 0.02 
Sciprof 0.04 0.03 -0.26 2.83 
Health 0.22 1.82 0.47 12.20 
Supply 0.14 0.95 -0.13 1.19 
Navy 0.82 97.40 0.84 135.88 
Marines -0.19 3.14 0.30 7.44 
Airforce -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.51 
Concordant 72.3% 71.5? 
N 8694 10599 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX E. WHITE 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 0.35 8.50 0.43 25.44 
Postgrad 0.67 17.00 1.16 46.29 
Study 1.16 242.65 1.27 471.49 
Academy 0.30 7.63 0.57 44.01 
ROTC 0.08 0.93 0.22 12.99 
Married 1.27 241.74 1.08 229.28 
Children 0.24 10.40 0.08 1.42 
Priorsvc -0.16 3.66 -0.33 26.06 
Age -0.03 3.49 -0.02 5.63 
Tactical 0.28 7.68 0.19 5.15 
Intel 0.43 6.23 0.21 2.99 
Engmaint 0.22 3.64 0.01 0.01 
Sciprof 0.13 0.32 -0.24 2.15 
Health 0.18 1.09 0.50 11.94 
Supply 0.18 1.14 -0.17 1.74 
Navy 0.88 100.78 0.87 132.28 
Marines -0.12 1.17 0.30 6.71 
Airforce 0.05 0.55 -0.04 0.52 
Concordant 72.25 71.95 
N 7699 9427 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX F. ETHNIC 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 0.19 0.55 0.11 0.32 
Postgrad 1.63 5.71 0.56 2.30 
Study 1.02 33.99 1.18 55.22 
Academy 0.79 6.42 0.17 0.45 
ROTC 0.22 1.13 0.05 0.08 
Married 0.99 23.37 0.76 15.25 
Children 0.20 1.18 0.07 0.17 
Priorsvc 0.07 0.12 -0.44 5.82 
Age 0.04 1.23 -0.07 6.62 
Tactical 0.06 0.10 -0.13 0.43 
Intel -0.38 0.94 -0.25 0.64 
Engmaint 0.12 0.26 -0.06 0.09 
Sciprof -0.50 0.86 -0.26 0.25 
Health 1.03 3.22 0.26 0.55 
Supply 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Navy 0.41 2.52 0.50 4.35 
Marines -0.83 4.51 0.51 1.09 
Airforce -0.30 3.05 -0.02 0.01 
Concordant 69.4% 68.9% 
N 995 1172 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX G. BLACK 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 0.17 0.33 0.01 0.01 
Postgrad 1.44 3.98 0.80 2.97 
Study 1.04 24.84 1.18 32.75 
Academy 0.96 5.87 0.67 3.20 
ROTC 0.32 1.60 0.13 0.34 
Married 0.97 15.55 0.84 12.06 
Children 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.01 
Priorsvc 0.18 0.47 -0.30 1.80 
Age 0.07 2.07 -0.05 2.03 
Tactical -0.01 0.01 -0.29 1.37 
Intel -0.12 0.04 -0.26 0.37 
Engmaint 0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.10 
Sciprof -0.34 0.34 -0.49 0.79 
Health 0.92 1.76 0.22 0.19 
Supply 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 
Navy 0.37 1.37 0.12 0.14 
Marines -1.06 4.52 0.03 0.01 
Airforce -0.44 4.69 -0.28 1.57 
Concordant 69.4^ 68.9% 
N 660 734 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
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APPENDIX H. HISPANIC 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.91 
Postgrad 89.72 0.00 0.50 0.14 
Study 1.07 3.97 1.61 9.63 
Academy 0.31 0.14 0.04 0.01 
ROTC 0.56 0.89 0.34 0.18 
Married 0.98 2.60 0.83 1.18 
Children 0.57 1.23 0.29 0.26 
Priorsvc 0.90 1.75 0.08 0.01 
Age 0.14 1.04 0.05 0.28 
Tactical 0.69 1.12 0.18 0.05 
Intel -0.27 0.09 -1.11 0.74 
Engmaint 0.86 1.31 -0.50 0.42 
Sciprof -1.11 0.44 0.00 0.00 
Health 90.85 0.00 0.17 0.02 
Supply 1.37 1.12 -1.10 1.28 
Navy 0.40 0.34 -0.34 0.09 
Marines -0.86 0.87 -0.21 0.01 
Airforce -0.26 0.27 -0.68 0.42 
Concordant 69.75 75.05 
N 169 126 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX I. OTHER 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 
Variable 1977 1980 
Estimate Wald 
Chi-Sq 
Female 0.20 0.07 
Postgrad 89.51 0.00 
Study 1.00 4.62 
Academy 0.42 0.28 
ROTC -0.37 0.36 
Married 1.18 4.30 
Children 0.21 0.20 
Priorsvc -0.96 3.32 
Age -0.12 1.26 
Tactical -0.50 0.53 
Intel -1.53 2.33 
Engmaint -0.52 0.47 
Sciprof 0.00 0.00 
Health -0.30 0.04 
Supply -0.75 0.47 
Navy 0.13 0.04 
Marines -1.01 0.70 





















Concordant 69.7? 72.1? 
N 166 312 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX J. USN 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 0.54 4.75 0.50 6.52 
Ethnic -0.72 9.84 -0.43 4.41 
Postgrad 0.29 0.20 0.48 0.94 
Study 0.78 18.17 1.03 45.34 
Academy 0.24 1.27 0.22 1.50 
ROTC -0.48 6.15 -0.27 2.37 
Married 1.46 81.43 1.27 74.39 
Children 0.56 11.13 0.29 4.22 
Priorsvc -0.25 1.66 -0.42 8.07 
Age -0.01 0.07 -0.09 14.14 
Tactical 0.79 13.08 0.35 2.69 
Intel 0.39 1.05 1.14 10.31 
Engmaint 0.61 6.49 0.17 0.54 
Sciprof 0.15 0.15 -0.38 1.14 
Health 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.07 
Supply 0.59 2.18 0.11 0.10 
Concordant 75.1% 71.8% 
N 2176 2246 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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APPENDIX K. USA 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female 0.40 4.80 -0.17 1.63 
Ethnic -0.23 3.77 0.02 0.03 
Postgrad 0.42 2.98 0.42 1.13 
Study 0.75 44.70 0.83 61.35 
Academy 0.48 7.30 0.38 7.70 
ROTC 0.07 0.33 -0.04 0.20 
Married 0.96 52.56 0.84 48.16 
Children 0.03 0.09 -0.12 1.30 
Priorsvc -0.19 2.64 -0.10 0.41 
Age -0.05 4.10 -0.13 42.67 
Tactical 0.14 1.06 -0.35 5.58 
Intel 0.26 1.36 -0.18 0.73 
Engmaint 0.03 0.03 -0.36 4.70 
Sciprof 0.67 0.69 1.29 1.43 
Health 0.13 0.11 0.46 3.70 
Supply 0.07 0.11 -0.51 6.08 
Concordant 64.5% 66.3' 
N 2794 3022 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
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APPENDIX L. USMC 0-4 PROMOTION PROBABILITY MODEL, 1977, 1980 





Female -0.31 0.28 -0.39 0.36 
Ethnic -0.98 7.05 0.10 0.04 
Postgrad -1.39 1.23 0.00 0.00 
Study 0.39 2.26 0.44 2.13 
Academy -0.19 0.25 0.33 1.06 
ROTC 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.19 
Married 0.63 5.38 0.91 7.61 
Children 0.13 0.34 -0.98 11.53 
Priorsvc 0.21 0.94 0.01 0.01 
Age 0.05 0.95 0.01 0.04 
Tactical -0.05 0.01 0.37 0.41 
Intel 0.48 0.42 -1.06 1.39 
Engmaint 0.77 1.78 0.04 0.01 
Sciprof 89.57 0.00 -88.98 0.00 
Health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Supply 0.49 0.86 -0.85 1.79 
Concordant 62.1% 59.1% 
N 591 504 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC. 
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Female 0.14 0.59 
Ethnic -0.63 21.09 
Postgrad 1.20 25.09 
Study 1.62 245.45 
Academy 0.53 6.79 
ROTC 0.49 8.42 
Married 1.34 105.56 
Children 0.33 7.63 
Priorsvc -0.10 0.39 
Age 0.01 0.01 
Tactical 0.06 0.12 
Intel 0.09 0.08 
Engmaint 0.11 0.37 
Sciprof -0.05 0.03 
Health 1.12 12.81 




















Concordant 77.0% 76.4= 
N 3133 4827 
Source:  Derived from data provided by DMDC, 
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